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NEGOTIATING GENDER:
A COMPARISON Oli' RAPE LAWS IN CANADA,
FINLAND, AND PAKISTAN
DANETTE C. CASHMANt

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Sexuality/Or humans neverJitsl is: it has 110 reality sui generous, and a
concern with ii always brings with ti wtder social psychic issues in
their wake. Human sexualities have to be sociallyproduced (no human
can eJ!er Jitst do ii), socially organized, socially maintmized and
socially
And, as cultures change, so do sexualtlies. 1

Since the 1970s, rape has been a central theme of feminist research
in North America. The issue has garnered volumes of papers, books, and
theses, spanning a range of disciplines and topics including, to name just
a few: psychoanalytical inquiries into the mind of the rapist and his
victims; strategies of resistance and avoidance; cost-benefit analyses of
using law as an instrument of control and sexual regulation; and,
investigations into the competence of medical research to conoborate
(or confute) crimes of rape. The goals underlying the feminist interest in
rape are several. No longer content to view rape as the pathological act
of a lone and isolated perpetrator, feminists have sought a sociological
understanding of the meaning of rape. Feminists have also sought legal
reform, attempting to give voice to women's experience of rape in a
discourse that has traditionally excluded women's perspectives despite
the fact that theirs were the bodies actually implicated in the crime.
Feminist legal research has persuasively shown how the criminal law
has traditionally represented and protected male interests and
standpoints, largely ignoring the hann done to the victim. In addition to

t The author is deeply gratefit! to the JO!lowtizg people/or he/pti1g to Jill ill the gaps it1 the
English literature 011 Flilllish rape law: Heildd Jaatinen, Prqfessor {)(Criminal Law al Tur/at
University, Meri Steinburg, Advocate far Umom; the Flil!lish League of Women, Pliivi
Honkafllkia, Research Qfficer at the National Research /11sli!t1/e rfLegal Policy, a!ld Ftimish
Law Student Tuomas Koip11/a. Special thanks lo Keplif No11siaine11, Professor ()(Legal
The01y at Helsli1ki University.
1
Ken Plummer, "Forward" in !irfiv note 5 at xvii.
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the above, feminists and women's action groups have sought to develop
new strategies of resistance and prevention.
The importance of law in feminist discussions of rape cannot be
underestimated. Initially motivated by what were perceived as injustices
within the legal system, implicitly and inevitably, the feminist inquiry
always ends where it begins, with a discursive exchange with the law.
This, despite ever increasing demands that women look outside the law
to find new strategies of resistance. In the modem world, law as an
"instrument of truth,'' 2 to use Carol Smart's words, has become a site of
gender conflict. The feminist inquiry into rape has clearly demonstrated
how gender categories are both constructed and maintained through
legal systems. But if law is a site of gender construction, it is also a site
of gender renegotiation.
Noticeably absent from the body of feminist literature are accounts
of rape that are historically and culturally situated. Illich, for instance,
argues that:
[t]he social history of modern rape still remains to be written, in part
because modern, sexist rape under assumptions of general conditions
of scarcity still has not been clearly distinguished from age-old forms
of physical, genital violence against women ... what American women
now fear most is rape as the supreme physical expression of modem
sexism-and sexism as an experience always tastes of this rape. I
argue that modern rape is implicitly fostered by the obliteration of
gender. 3

Illich recognizes that the definition, practice and experience of rape is
socially and culturally contingent. But with few exceptions, feminist
analyses tend to proceed from the assumption that rape is a universal
phenomenon that produces common experiences for women. Crosscultural analyses, when they are done at all, become tools for verifying
and thereby legitimating feminist conclusions. 4 Cultural and historical
2
Carol Smart, "Law's body, the Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse" (1990) 11: 17
Journal of Law and Sociology 194.
3
Ivan Illich, Gender (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983) at 31-32. See also Herietta
Moore, "The problem of explaining violence in the social science" in Penelope Harvey and
Peter Gow, eds., Sex a!ld Violence: /ssues ti1 representatioll a!ld experie11ce (New York:
Routledge, 1994) 13 8, who sees crisis in gender identity as a source of violence in gender
relations.
4
For an exception to the rule see Cecilia McCallum "Ritual and the origin of sexuality in
Alto Xingu" in Penelope Harvey and Peter Gow, eds., Sex and Violence: /ssues i11
representatioll and experience (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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vanat10n has been effectively ignored and silenced in the North
American discussions. This position is unjustified in light of Simon's
claim that "all discourses of sexuality are inherently discourses about
something else; sexuality rather than serving as a constant thread that
unifies the totality r:f human experience is the ultimate dependent
variable, requiring explanation more often than it provides explanation"
[emphasis added].5
The crime of rape is unique insofar as it defines deviant sexual
activity and therefore establishes the limits and terms of n01mal
heterosexual encounters and gender relations. It is therefore essential
that the meaning of rape be considered in cultural specificity. This is not
to say that cross-cultural comparison at a micro level is never
appropriate, or that universal themes never emerge. These approaches,
however, need to be exercized with caution, heeding the logical
coherence of different cultural forms. If we accept feminist claims that
rape is socially and culturally produced, then rape must be examined
within the framework of different legal and sexual cultures. Catherine
MacKinnon6 argues that, for feminism, (hetero)sexuality is analogous
to the economic base in Marxism; it is the foundation upon which the
superstructure of contemporary society is built. Even if one does not
subscribe completely to this argument, it nevertheless illustrates the
importance of examining the way in which different cultures understand
and use the sexual in constructing the gender relation. Examining the
law of rape in different cultural landscapes thus becomes an important
area of research for feminism.
In this paper, I analyze and compare the definition of rape in three
different legal and sexual cultures: Finland, Pakistan, and Canada.
Ultimately, it is an attempt to release the current feminist discourse from
the straight-jacket of theoretical essentialism. In many ways, this work
represents three separate undertakings, which are themselves selfcontained and self-defining. The common thread that links them,
however, is the way in which the law of rape serves as a site of gender
negotiation. In each case, the way in which the question of rape is
framed, understood, and negotiated is a product of the legal culture in
William Simon, Poslmodem Sexualities (London: Routledge, 1996) at xvii.
Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist The01y (}f the Stale (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989).
5

6
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which it is situated. Comparative analysis of rape law demonstrates the
synergic interplay between law and culture and highlights the fact that
rape as it is legally defined is culturally contingent. The law of rape not
only impacts on how rape is culturally understood, but the legal culture
in which the law is situated sets the parameters of negotiation and
reform. Thus, in Canada, liberal legalism has been a defining feature in
the evolution of the rape laws. In Finland, the emergence of 'women's
law' has, in a legopolitical climate of 'gender harmony', created a
discursive space for feminists to begin to address issues of violence
against women. And, in Pakistan, the current trends towards
Islamization poses special challenges for the way in which women are
able to articulate crimes of sexual violence. Western frames of
reference, though informative, can ultimately be counterproductive if
they are not properly tailored, to meet the cultural and legal
requirements of Islam including recognition of the special status that
women's sexuality plays in maintaining the social order. In the pages
that follow, I will undertake to examine the intersection of law and
culture in the legal definition of rape. In each of the cases studies, rape
law emerges as a site of gender negotiation, but, as will be demonstrated,
the issues surrounding legal ref01m are culturally unique in te1ms of
both content and process.

II. THE LAW OF RAPE IN CANADA: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The area where co11tempormy/e1111i1ism has sz(/fered the most se!fil?f!icted damage is rape. What began as a l!Sf!fitl sensitization o.fpolice
officers, prosecutors, a!7d judges to the clatins qf authe!7tic rape
victims turned into a hallucinat01y owrextensio11 qf the definition of
rape to cover eve1y u11pleasa11t or embarrassti1g sexual e11coz111ter.
Rape became the cnine qf cnines, overshadow1i1g all qf the wars,
massacres, and disasters o.f wor!d history. The femimst obsession with
rape as a symbol ofmalefamale relations is irrational and delusional.
From the perspective qfthefi1ture, this period tiz America will look like
a reign qfmass psychosis, like that o.fthe Salem witch trials. 7

7

Camille Paglia, Vamps & Tramps (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) at 24.
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Reforming rape and sexual assault law has been a central issue for
Canadian women's groups since the 1970s. Informed by the rape debate
in the United States, one of the central philosophical issues for feminists
has been 'what are the characteristics of the offending act that transform
it from sex into rape.' This has been a divisive issue for feminist
academics. Early strategies for reform involved de-emphasizing the
sexual nature of the act and defining rape as a violent attack, analogous
to other types of assault. But later feminists, responding to this
definition, have argued that the problem of rape is really a problem of
the way gender is constructed, and produced, in society. Society cannot
stop rape until gender relations are reconstructed. As a result, this later
generation of feminist have sought to re-establish rape as a sexual crime.
This strategy, however, has been criticized by feminists committed to
the liberal ideal. An interesting aspect of evolution of Canadian rape law
is the way in which legislators have responded to feminist criticisms by
reconstituting old conceptual forms, in particular liberal legalism.

Laws

Historical Perspective

Prior to 1983, rape in Canada was defined as 'sexual intercourse by
a male person with a female person who is not his wife without her
consent, or with her consent if the consent was extorted by threats of fear
or bodily hann, is obtained by personating her husband, or by false
representations of the nature and quality of the act.' 8 'Indecent Assault
of a Female' and 'Indecent Assault of a Man by a Man' were both
separate categories of offences. In general, however, these latter
provisions were reserved for situations of sexual contact with children
where no force was used. 9 With some exceptions, the Canadian
legislation reflected the way in which rape was dealt with in other
western jurisdictions, most notably in the United States. Where drafting
differences existed, similar patterns of judicial interpretation, as well as
common rules of evidence, meant that the crime of rape was similarly
treated among common law jurisdictions.
During the 1970s and 80s, the subject of rape was taken up as a
cause of feminism, and the rape law itself became a source of

8
9

Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crim1i10! Low: Sexual Offe11ces, 1978 at 55.
Ibid. at 18-9.
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controversy for women's groups, not only in Canada, but in England, 10
Australia, 11 and the United States.12 Criticism was launched at the basic
legal definition of rape, as well as at the law of evidence insofar as it
impacted on the definitional landscape. Feminists attacked the basic
definition of rape, as it emerged from the legislative texts, common law
doctrines and rules of evidence. The central issue was the way in which
the legal definition of rape both directly and indirectly represented male
perspectives and interests, rather than those of the victim. 13
Feminists objected to what they perceived as the gender inequities
of the rape provisions. For women's groups who based their demands
for reform on liberal principles of individual autonomy, selfdetermination, and equality, the fact that rape, as it was legally defined,
could only be perpetrated by a man on a woman, had particular symbolic
significance. Inequality with respect to culpability could not be justified
within a liberal framework. Furthermore, feminists saw the language of
rape as connotatively emphasizing the act of sexual penetration and thus
privileging a male perspective with respect to the essential nature of
sexual crimes. The marital exemption was also a prime target of
criticism. Typically, the justifications that were offered for the exception
included: that a rape charge would disrupt familial hannony; that, in an
era before no-fault divorce, a change in the legislation could lead to false
accusations; and finally that rape within the context of mmTiage would
be too difficult to prove. For women's groups, however, the fact that
there was no legal recourse for a woman who had been raped by her
husband was an affront to a woman's self-determination and physical
integrity. Moreover, at a symbolic level, women objected to the law's
implied notion that, upon marriage, women were consenting to all future
acts of intercourse. Thus, by shifting to a generic sexual assault

10

See Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape 011 Trial (New York: Peguin Books, 1997).
See Gail Mason, "Reforming the law of rape: incursions into the masculinist sanctum" in
Diane Kirkby, ed., Sex; Fower and ./Nslice: Historical Perspectives ofLaw in Allstralia (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 50.
12
See Mary Ann Largen, "Rape-Law Reform: An Analysis" in Ann Wolbe1i Burgess, ed.,
Rape and Sexual Assault H (New York: Garland Publishing, I 988) 271.
13
For a general examination of the evolution of the legislative reform in Canada see:
Loreen Snider, "Legal Reform and Social Control: the Dangers of Abolishing Rape" ( 1985) 13
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 337; Jennifer Temkin, "Women, Rape and Law
Refonn" in Sy Ivana Tomaselli & Roy Potier, eds., Rape (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
11
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provision, which emphasized the violent nature of rape, women hoped
to overcome the gender discrimination inherent in the law.
It should be noted that during this early period of reform, the notion
of consent was treated as relatively unproblematic. Lack of consent
(which could ordinarily be discerned by the fact that violence was used)
was seen to be the definitional element of the crime - it was what
transformed ordinary sex into the sexual attack. What eventually did
become an issue for reformers, however, was the way in which consent
was demonstrated in court, that is the way sexual history, general
lifestyle, and complainant character evidence was used to demonstrate
that a woman was, in some senses, 'unrapable.' Issues related to consent
also arose in the context of required fault. At common law, the Crown
must prove that the accused had subjective knowledge of the lack of
consent. Thus, there is no requirement that a mistake with respect to
consent be a reasonable one. 14 A question therefore arises as to whether
subjective knowledge is the appropriate standard of fault or whether
something less should be required. 15 Debate over the appropriateness of
the consent requirement itself, however, has largely only occurred
outside of the legal discourse.
Women's demands for reform extended not only to the legislative
definitions of the offence, but also to the laws of evidence insofar as they
impacted on the basic definitional issue. The first issue of concern was
in regards to the common law doctrines of 'corroboration' and 'recent
complaint'. Under the doctrine of corroboration, an accused could not be
convicted unless the victim could produce corroboratory evidence, such
as bruises or a witness to the act, which could support her testimony or
version of events. Under the doctrine of recent complaint, juries were
warned about the general unreliability of testimony from a complainant
who failed to rep01i an attack in a timely manner. A second area of
concern was the unadulterated use of the victim's sexual history as
evidence of consent. Together, victim's advocates argued, these rules of
evidence created 'rape myths' which ultimately defined rape in a way

14
See the Supreme Court's decision in: R. v. Pappajohn [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, where it was
affirmed that mistaken belief in consent can fonn the basis of a defense. It was, however, held
that there needed to be an "air of reality" to the defense before it could be presented to the jury.
15
In R v. Scmsgarel [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, the Supreme Comt held that "willful blindness"
could constitute the mental element of rape.
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that protected male, rather than the victim's, interests. These myths
included, among others, that 'woman often lie about being raped', that
'only chaste women can be raped,' that 'when a women says no, she can
be seduced into sex,' and that 'a women consents when she doesn't
resist.'
As has already been stated, during the 1970s and 80s, rape became
a central issue for feminist scholarship. Criticisms directed at specific
pieces of legislation soon led to a broader discussion of the content and
structure of the legal system and the nature of the heterosexual
relationship. It is necessary to understand the content of the larger
debates in order to understand the direction that the law has taken since
this early period.

2. The Philosophical Debate and Emerging Feminist Strategies
The philosophical debate in N01ih America has primarily focused
on the (re) definition of rape or sexual assault, so that womens
experiences formed the content of the law. The debate was spurred, in
part, by a perceived inadequacy with respect to the way in which rape
was handled in the criminal justice system - an inadequacy that
manifested itself in under-reporting, low conviction rates, and a feeling
on the part of the victim that she was being 'raped' a second time by the
criminal justice process. With respect to this latter issue, MacKinnon
argues that one of the reasons that women do not report incidents of rape
is that:
[they] cannot bear to have their personal account of sexual abuse
reduced to a fantasy they invented, used to define them and to pleasure
the finders of fact and the public. I think that they have a very real
sense that their accounts are enjoyed, that others are getting pleasure
from the first-person recounting of their pain, and that is the content of
the humiliation at these rituals. When rape victims say they feel raped
again on the stand, and victims of sexual harassment say they feel
sexually harassed in adjudication, it is not exactly a metaphor. I hear
that they - in being publicly sexually humiliated by the system, as by
the perpetrator - are pornography. The first time it happens, it is called
freedom; the second time, it is called justice. 16

16

Catherine Mac Kinnon, Feminism U11mod;jled: Discourses 011 Lfe and Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987) at 111.
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MacKinnon's account of the rape trial demonstrates how:
women come to embody the standard fantasy of the pleasure of abuse
and sexual power. It is not just that they must repeat the violation in
words, not that they may be judged to be lying, but that the women's
story gives pleasure in the way that pornography gives pleasure. The
naming of parts becomes almost a sexual act, in that it draws attention
to the sexualized body. But her account, distorted by the crossquestioning techniques of the defense counsel, does not only sexualize
her, it becomes a pornographic vignette. Unfortunately for the woman
in the dock she differs from the photograph because she is there in the
flesh to feel her humiliation. The judge, the lawyers, the jury, and the
public can gaze on her body and re-enact her violation in their
imaginations. 17

Burniller 18 illustrates how these types of sexual imaginings by the
audience are enabled by the legal discourse itself, manifested in the trial
techniques of examination and cross-examination. The process is meant
to "separat[e] out the truth from the hysteria of the victim" 19 and, in the
end, stifles the woman's ability to recount the event as she experienced
it. Bumiller warns:
The forms of communication that are appropriate in a courtroom and
that are disseminated by the media conform to conventions of the
'public discourse' of news reporiing and the 'professional discourse'
of criminal procedure. If reformers strive toward transforming the
social construction of rape, even abandoning the model of consent,
then changes in the public understanding of the crime may only come
about with challenges to the dominance of the legal discourse. 20

From its inception, feminist writing on the topic involved a broad
inquiry into the interaction between the crime of rape and the larger
social structures that construct women as the victims of rape. The early
research focused on the way in which traditional ideas of gender
sexuality for instance, man as (nonnatively?) sexually aggressive and

17

Carol Smart, Fem1ilislll 011d the Power o/low (New York: Routledge, 1989).
Kristin Bumiller, "Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence against Women in
Legal Culture" in Martha Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen, eds., Al the Boundaries o/ Low:
Fellltilism a11d legal The01y (New York Routledge, 1991) 95.
19
Ibid at 108.
20
/bidat 110.
18
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women as (normatively?) sexually passive21 - became implicated in
legal definitions and procedures. In addition, early feminist22 writing
demonstrated the way in which rape laws have traditionally represented
male interests and perspectives. 23 An inquiry into the social and cultural
aspects of rape eventually led feminists to the problem of what
distinguished rape, from a woman's point of view, from normal
heterosexual acts. Traditionally the law solved this problem by
categorizing women as rapable or non-rapable, and, for the fonner, rape
occurred in the context of extra-marital intercourse. Drawing on the
work of Anna Clark, Smart argues:
consent was crucial in the nineteenth century, but the meaning of that
consent is quite different than the meaning of consent now ... consent
was not a matter of woman's will or whether she resisted or not. Rather
consent was a matter of how she conducted herself, whether she - by
her conduct - made it clear that she was the sexual prope1ty of her
husband or her father or the common property of all men. So if a
woman was deemed to be unchaste, it did not matter whether she
clearly resisted the rape, she had consented at a general level. 24

Smart goes on to argue that the legal (and social?) context of rape has
changed so that "consent and non-consent are no longer the self-evident
properties of certain categories of women. Consent is being
psychologized, it is becoming the state of mind which can be attributed
to all or any women. To this extent rape is being democratized." 25 Thus,
the distinguishing features of sexual assault have become a central issue
for feminist scholars. As Griffin notes, "[t]hough the law of rape
attempts to make clear a division between rape and sexual intercourse, in
fact, the courts find it difficult to distinguish between a case where the

21 This idea has been extensively written about both within and outside of legal
discourse. See, for instance, Susan Edwards Female Sexuality a11cl !he law (Oxford: Maitin
Robertson, 1981) and Susan Brownmiller's seminal work Agai11sl Our Will· Men. Jf/ome11
a11cl Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975).
22 I tend to see the rape discourse as an evolution, but not in the sense of linear
development or the simple accumulation of knowledge, but rather as a continual taking up
and responding to other positions, a process that ultimately leaves no position unmodified
or unchanged.
23 Brownmiller, supra note 21.
24
Supra note 17 at 41 .
25
Ibid
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decision to copulate was mutual and where a man forced himself upon
his partner." 26
The relationship between rape and normal heterosexual intercourse
has been a source of controversy and has, to some extent, caused a rift in
the feminist community. Burgess-Jackson27 has discerned two streams
of thought in the feminist rape debate- those who see rape as battery and
those who see rape as degradation. From his perspective, both of these
factions are participating in what he calls "persuasive redefinition" using the emotive content of the language of rape to redefine its
substantive qualities. For the liberal feminist, who defines the offensive
act as battery, rape is viewed as deviant sexual activity in which an
individual's freedom to choose is suspended, where the victim becomes
an object, or an instrument of use, for the rapist. Thus, lack of consent the bypassing of the victim's subjectivity becomes the defining feature
of the crime of rape. The radical feminist, who defines rape as
degradation, also sees the objectification of women as what is at stake in
the crime of rape. But this objectification is not seen as an act of
deviance, but, rather, as integral to the normal heterosexual relationship,
which is always marked by power difference. Lack of consent cannot be
the defining feature of rape because, from the radical perspective,
consent is always coerced
Feminists are also divided on the issue of whether rape is about
'sex' or 'violence.' In order to achieve a critical standpoint with respect
to the traditional cultural and legal definitions of rape, early feminist
writings focused on the subjective consequences of a rape event for the
individual women, leading to a theoretical position that rape is an act of
'aggression' or 'violence' and that what is at stake in the crime ofrape is
also what is at stake in any other type of assault. Although this position
gained favour by legal refonners, it has become highly controversial in
the more philosophical discourses. Critics argue that "the complex
relations between sexuality and power is underscored by the fact that
rape, and the fear of rape, are experienced by women sexually, not as

26
Susan Griffin, "Rape: the All-American Crime" in Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick
Elliston & Jane English, eds., Femtidsm and Philosophy (New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1977) 313 at 318.
27
Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical l11J!estigation (Vermont: Dartmouth
Publishing, 1996).
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domination." 28 Smart says that it is "a dubious feminist strategy that, in
finding sex problematic, attempts to transpose it into violence as
something easier to deal with. It overlooks that violence is not violence
if it is sexualized, or that violence is exonerated if pleasure can be
achieved." 29 To view rape as about violence, rather than sex, is seen as a
mistake because rape cannot simply be viewed as a tragic event in the
life of the particular woman involved. Rather it is representative of,
although perhaps in its extreme form, the heterosexual relation. To
divorce sex from rape is dangerous because it makes invisible the fact
that "rape is a man's act, whether it is a male or a female man and
whether it is a man relatively permanently or relatively temporarily; and
being raped is a woman's experience whether it is a female or a male
woman and whether it is relatively permanently or relatively
temporarily."30 MacKinnon, who is perhaps the modem spokeswoman
for the 'rape is sex' position, argues:
If sexuality is central to women's definition and forced sex is central to
sexuality, rape is indigenous, not exceptional to women's condition. In
feminist analysis, a rape is not an isolated event or moral transgression
or individual interchange gone wrong but an act of terrorism and
torture within a systemic context of group subjugation, like
lynching. 31

In other words, rape is a consequence of a social context that treats
sexuality in terms of gendered, hierarchical nonns. 32 For McKinnon,
Karl Marx was wrong - sex, and not economics, is the base upon which
the social superstructure of Western society is built.
To expend much energy on the 'violence vs. sex' debate is, to some
extent, to pursue a red herring. Rape is, of course, both. Marcus defines
rape as a "sexualized and gendered attack which imposes sexual

28
Winfred Woodhull, "Sexuality, Power and the Question of Rape" in Irene Diamond and
Lee Quinby, eds., Femtilism & Foucault: Rejlec!io11 011 Resistance (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1988) 167 atl 71.
29
Supra note 17 at 46.
3° Carolyn Shafer & Marilyn Frye, "Rape and Respect" in Mmy Vetterling-Braggin et. al.,
eds., Femti1is111 a11d Flu!osop!ty (New Jersey Rowman and Littlefield, 1977) 333 at 333.
31
note 16 at 172.
32
This does not mean that rape wouldn't occur in other social settings, but it would have a
different meaning. Just as sexuality is socially constructed, the meaning of rape is necessarily
tied to that construction.
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difference along the lines of violence. " 33 For the early feminists,
however, it was necessary to disengage rape from legal and cultural
norms that overdetermined its defining characteristics as sexual, where
sexuality was understood from the male perspective. Strategically, then,
feminists began to focus their analysis on the very real aspects of
violence and aggression in the sexual attack. Their project was
successful in initiating legislative reform, in large part, because it was
compatible with the prevailing ideology of liberalism: the protection of
woman's bodies and self-integrity was seen as a natural extension of the
law. Lacey argues that "[i]n a modem liberal system, the most obviously
relevant interest - the one which forms the normative framework for
many academic commentaries on the sexual offences, is sexual
autonomy the freedom to determine one's own sexual experiences, to
choose how and with whom one expresses oneself sexually." 34 What has
emerged since that early period, however, is a shift in emphasis to the
broader issues of how rape is actually produced in and through culture.
Foa, for instance, argues:
against those who maintain that the special wrongness of rape arises
from and is completely explained by a societal refusal to recognize
women as people ... The special wrongness of rape is due to, and is only
an exaggeration of, the wrongness of our sexual interactions in
general. Thus, a clear analysis of the special wrongness of rape will
help indicate some of the essential features of healthy, non-rapine
sexual interactions. 35

This shift in emphasis, like the earlier shift to rape-as-violence, should
be seen as a strategic response to current cultural norms. The strategy is,
of course, shaped by the current discursive climate, of which the rapeas-violence discourse is part. The following passage is illustrative:
The refusal to link the crime to sex comes in response to the
reactiona1y claim that rape is the inevitable result of a supposedly
innate male aggressivity coupled with an uncontrollable sexual need.
However, the feminist counterargument ultimately rests on a notion of
33
Sharon Marcus "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory of Politics and Rape
Prevention" in Judith Butler & Joan Scott, eds., Femi11isl.r Theorize the Political (New York:
Routledge, 1992) 385 at 397.
34
Nicola Lacey "Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Feminism, Sex and Criminal
Law" Legal The01y Workshop Series (University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 1997) at 4.
35
Pamela Foa, "What's Wrong with Rape" in Mary Vetterling-Braggin et. al., eds.,
Feminism a11d Philosophy (New Jersey Rowman and Littlefield, 1977) 34 7 at 34 7.
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power divorced from sex, as if sex preexisted the social, from which
power is said to derive. In doing so, it falls prey to the ruse of power
cited by Foucault, namely, the designation of "sex as a biological or
ontological given whose function is to guarantee that sexuality appear
to have its origin outside of and prior to power. To accept this
theoretical alibi is thus unwittingly to comply with the power one aims
to elude. 36

The current strategy is thus to provide a broader critique of gendered
power than the sex-as-violence discourse will allow.
For critics like Catherine MacKinnon and Carol Smart, social
institutions in general, and the law in particular, normalize "dominator
models"37 of sexual interaction by eroticizing them. Recognizing the
difficulties inherent in current legal structures, however, cannot lead to
social determinism if it is to achieve its strategic purpose. As Sawacki
argues:
The relationship between the individual and society is not pictured as
one of social determination-complete socialization. Socialization
emerges as a theoretical project that is never fully realized in practice.
Therefore, social constructionism need not imply social determinism.
In such a relational view of personal identity, one's interests are a
function of one's place in the social field at a particular time, not
given. They are constantly open to change and contestation. 38

In order to take up the challenge posed by modem radical rape theory,
the issue that must be addressed by legal discourse is not only 'how is
law informed and determined by cultural norms of sexuality and
gender,' but 'how, as an instrument of the social, can the law be used to
produce cultural norms.' Marcus 39 defines rape as a "scripted
interaction" and suggests that women, in strategies of rape prevention,
attempt to disrupt the script. She advises women, for instance, to
disregard their traditional scripted role as victim or "subject of fear" and
to treat the rape event as a "subject-to-subject" encounter, similar to a
physical assault between men. She tells women to avoid seeing the penis
Woodhull, s1ipranote 29 atl70.
I borrow this term from Riane Eisler Sacred Pleasure: Sex, 1Wy1/? and !l!e Politics 0/1/Je
lJody New Pat/?s lo Power and Low (San Francisco: Harper, I 995).
38
Jana Sawicki, "Identity, Politics and Sexual Freedom" in Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby,
eds., Femi11ism & Foucault: Rejleclio11s 011 Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1988) 177 at 184.
39
Stipra note 34.
36
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as an "indestructible weapon that cannot help but rape'', but rather to
view it as a source of vulnerability. Marcus tells the tale of one woman
who, in the midst of her assault grabbed her assailant's penis and
threatened to "break it off', causing him to lose his erection and run off.
The law, of course, has been complicit in creating the social script of
rape. The question now becomes can the law be used as an 'instrument
of disruption,' 'a site of resistance,' or more particularly, 'a site for the
renegotiation of the social scripts of sexuality and gender.'
It is a matter of some controversy whether law can and should be
used as a site of renegotiation for broader gender relationships.
Bumiller, for instance, argues that such a possibility would require
"challenging the dominance of the legal discourse" and this idea poses a
problem for feminists who are committed to the liberal ideal. As has
already been argued, the success of the first wave of legal refonns was
due, in large part, because of its consistency with liberal legalism and
there is, therefore a reluctance to stray too far from liberal principles.
Moreover, there seems to be an unarticulated fear among many
women's groups that a move away from liberalism, as a conceptual
framework, may have the effect of reconstituting traditional legal forms.
Many feminists, however, question the adequacy of liberal forms.
Nedelsky argues that "[f]eminism appears equivocal in it stance toward
liberalism because it simultaneously demands a respect for women's
selfhood and rejects the language and assumptions of individual rights
that have been our culture's primary means of expressing and enforcing
respect for selfhood."40
Lacey and Bumiller both argue that the liberal principles that form
the foundations of modern rape laws are inherently problematic. Lacey
states:
It is an image of the body as territory, in the sense of both bounded
space and property; divorced from reason and emotion, bodies are
boundaries which separate autonomous individuals rather than aspects
of lived subjectivity within which subjects relate to one another. This
atomistic vision marginalises values which one might hope to see
criminal protect. 41

40
Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" in
Allan Hutchinson & Leslie Green, eds., Law and the Community: The End cf/11dividua!ism
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 220 ..
41
Supra note 35.
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For Lacey, the liberal construct of the "disembodied" and "atomistic"
subject does not serve to adequately protect those things that society
(women?) values most about the sexual encounter: "self-expression,
connection, intimacy, relationship." 42 For Bumiller, not only is the law
inadequate in its protection, but also potentially dangerous:
legal regulations in which the law appears to be protecting the ten-itory
of the self (ie., pornography and sexual assault) can be seen as creating
the social space to inscribe bodies with sexual fears and dangers of the
epidemic. The question becomes not how the body matters in legal
discourse, but how dangerous the law might become to its embodied
subjects. 43

Bumiller recognizes that it is the institution of rape that serves to oppress
women and deeply embedded within this institution is the legal
treatment of rape. Bumiller also recognizes, however, the possibilities
that law reform offers:
once the body is potentially seen as the site of oppression, then the law
is challenged to take into account the effect of "living" in a body
marked as different. For the law to see bodily difference, it would have
to bring into view the different experiences of both victims and
perpetrators of acts of oppression. 44

For both Bumiller and Lacey, the possibilities of the law serving as a site
of gender renegotiation are tied to a move from 'subject' to
'subjectivity.' The question becomes can such a move take place within
existing legal forms. Nedelsky's words are instructive here when she
states:
[f]eminism requires a new conception of autonomy. The prevailing
conception stands at the core of liberal theory and calTies with it the
individualism characteristic of liberalism. Such a conception cannot
meet the aspirations of feminist theory and is inconsistent with its
methodology. The basic value of autonomy is however, central to
feminism. Feminist theory must retain the value while rejecting its
liberal incarnation. 45

42

/bid. at 5.
Kristin Burniller, "Body Images: How does the Body Matter in the Legal Imagination"
in Bryant Garth & Austin Sarat, eds., How does the Low Motter.? (Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 1998) 145 at 159.
44
/bid. at 153.
45
St.t,<?ro note 40 at 219.
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3. Legal Reform in a Culture of Liberal Legalism
The revised sexual assault provisions were finally enacted in 1985
and the new legislation was comprehensive with respect to the way it
has responded to women's early critiques. 46 The 'rape' provision has
been repealed and replaced with a gender-neutral, three-tiered 'sexual
assault' law. The legislation distinguishes between three types of sexual
assault based on the level of violence used. The marital exception has
been eliminated and the act of penetration is no longer required. In
addition, the legislation includes a series of 'rape shield' provisions,
which are meant to preclude the defense from introducing irrelevant
sexual history evidence, as well as to limit the use to which such
evidence in the event that it is ultimately admitted. 47 Finally, the
corroboration48 and recent complaint doctrines 49 have been abrogated.
Consent has remained an explicit element, but in the cmTent legislation
is deemed to be invalid when brought about by force or threat thereof, by
fraud or by the exercise thereof. In 1992, the government again amended
the sexual assault provisions to include: an articulation of circumstances
in which the victim's consent would be vitiated; 50 limitations with
respect to the circumstances in which the accused could make use of the
mistaken belief in consent defense; 51 and, a reworking of the 'rape
shield' provisions in response to a declaration by the court of
unconstitutionality. 52 In 1997, legislators have also introduced a series
of new provisions relating to the production and use of the
complainant's psychiatric records. 53
From a legislative standpoint, the reforms directly responded to
and met the demands placed on them by women's groups. Stuart says of
the 1992 reforms: "the process was a partisan one, with the voices of
men, no doubt for the first time in the history of the development of

Cni11i11a/ Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.10.
Cni11i11a! Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.12.
48
Cni11inal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.11.
49
Crimli1al Code. R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.11.
5
° Cnimi1a/ Code, 1992, c.38, s.2.
51
Cninina/ Code, 1992, c.38, s.2.
52
0-iminal Code, 1992, c.38, s.1.
53
Cni11inal Code, 1997, c.30, s.1. These provisions were introduced to replace provisions
enacted in 1985, which were held to be unconstitutional in R. v. O'Co1111or [1995] 4
S.C.R.411.
46
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Canadian criminal law, largely excluded." 54 But the legal definition of
sexual assault is not dependent exclusively on the legislative texts.
Judicial interpretation and elaboration of the law are also important, and
can often put a halt to statut01y reform. Vandervort states:
In Canada a strong common law tradition and the preservation of
common law defenses, insofar as these are not inconsistent with
statutory provisions, tends to encourage deference to customary norms
and dominant social interests in the interpretation and enforcement of
statute law. 55

With respect to the judicial interpretation of the law, three general areas
of concern emerge: fault, relevance, and consent.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that there must be
subjective fault in order to convict an accused of sexual assault. Thus the
accused must either have actual knowledge of the victim's lack of
consent, or be reckless or willfully blind56 to such knowledge. In R. v.
Pappqjohn, 57 the court confirmed that subjective fault is a required
element and that the defense of 'honest but mistaken belief is simply an
abrogation of the required fault. One caveat, however, is that before a
defense of mistaken belief goes to the jury, there would have to be an 'air
of reality' to the defense. In practice, then, there is a shift in evidentiary
burden to the accused with respect to the issue of fault.
Many argue that subjective fault is an inappropriate measure of
guilt for sexual assault. Stuart suggests that "[t]he time has arrived for
Parliament to declare some criminal responsibility for objectively
unreasonable sexual behaviour,'' 58 although he does not believe the
"stigma" of sexual assault should be so attached. 59 Archard argues that
"men have a duty to take reasonable care lest women do not consent." 60
Archard maintains the impossibility a man being unaware of the
particular character of the intercourse in which he is engaging as this is

5

Don Stuart, Ccmaditm Crimillal Law: A T!·eatise (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 273.
Lucinda Vandervo1i, "Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea"
(1987) 2 Canadian Journal Of Woman and the Law 233 at 240.
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See R. v. Sa11sregret, supra note 15. This ruling has not been incorporated into the
legislative text.
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S!!pra note 14.
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Supra note 54 at 275.
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/bid. at 277.
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something that can be easily judged in terms of "pleasurability, ease,
duration, awkwardness, and so on"; 61 in other words, the lack of consent
becomes abundantly clear through a woman's body language. In
addition, a man can desist from intercourse with little or no cost to
himself, while the costs of forcing or coercing unconsented sex on a
woman are considerable. Archard argues that men should exercize care
by "being sensitive to a lack of evidence on the part of a
woman, ... evidence [which] is palpable, or ... can be made so if men take
certain measures." 62
Section 273 .2(b) of the Criminal Code prohibits the accused from
raising the issue of honest but mistaken belief if he "did not take
reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time,
to ascertain that the complainant was consenting." This provision seems
to be creating an objective standard with respect to fault. Stuart argues
that the provision raises a constitutional question because it is an
objective standard that "does not require a marked departure from the
objective norm." 63 The issue of the way in which section 273.2(b)
impacts upon the whole of the sexual assault provisions, however,
particularly with respect to issue of the required fault, has not yet been
directly dealt with by the court. The explicit move from a subjective to
an objective standard, however, will be a difficult one for the court.
Burgess-Jackson states:
on no other aspect of rape law is the disagreement between liberals and
radicals clearer - and for that reason more politically charged - than
the mental state necessary for criminal liability. The disagreement
over me17s rea raises large, complex, and difficult issues, some
conceptual and some evaluative, concerning the purpose of the
criminal law, the comparative importance in that body of law of
harmful results and culpable mindsets, and the appropriate
punishment for the different results and mindsets. 64
Liberalism as a theory seeks to protect the individual, qua individual,
from the zeal of various majorities and from political and legal
pressures to use individuals as a means to collective ends, such as the
prevention of crime. The doctrine of me11s rea is designed and
functions, at least in part, to ensure that only those individuals who are
/bid. at 144.
Ibid. at 145.
63
Supra note 54 at 278.
64
Supra note 28 at 137.
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both deten-able and deserving of punishment are punished. It seeks to
treat individual fairly, taking into account their particularities and the
details of their conduct. The law of rape, like the law of battery
incorporates this mental element, as one would expect if the liberal
the01y has been instrumental in shaping it [emphasis added]. 65

Discarding the subjective element of fault, particularly in an offence that
is as politically charged as sexual assault, is an attack on the discourse of
liberal legalism itself.
Another area of concern for law reformers involves the
admissibility of evidence relating to the complainant's sexual history,
lifestyle, and therapeutic history. The rape shield provisions
substantially curtail the admissibility of this evidence, but the Supreme
Court has thrice struck down these laws on the basis that they infringed
the accused's right to full answer and defense. 66 In R. v. Oslin, 67 the
Court demonstrated a willingness to uphold the current legislative
provisions limiting the use of sexual history evidence provided that
there was residual discretion granted to the trial judge to admit the
evidence where "probative value outweighed prejudice." In the recent
case of R v. Mtlls, 68 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the latest Criminal Code provisions restricting defense access to the
complainant's therapeutic records on the grounds that the right to full
answer and defence in the context of sexual assault cases cannot be
defined without reference to the complainant's equality and privacy
rights. The legislative provisions considered by the court in both Oslin
and Mtlls instruct the trial judge to balance the defendant's and the
complainant's constitutional rights. 69 In balancing these rights and
65

Ibid. at 60
The Supreme Court in both ForJyt!te v. /?. (1980), 53 C.C.C. (2d) 225 (S.C.C.) and/?. v.
Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 strike down legislative restrictions on the admissibility of a
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69 It was established by the co mi in Seaboyer, supra note 66 that sexual assault laws invoke
the equality rights of women. Several reasons have been miiculated for this including: that
sexual assault is disproportionately a crime perpetrated by men against women; that gender
stereotypes are often associated with the prosecution of the crime; and that as a result of the
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weighing the probative value of the evidence, the trial judge is not
permitted to use lines of reasoning that are based on "groundless myth
and fantasized stereotypes." 70 However, the grant of judicial discretion
remains problematic.
The problem with judicial discretion is twofold. First, the
accused's Constitutional rights to full answer and defense have
generally taken precedence over the rights of the victim. For the last
several years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the accused
right to full answer and defense needs to be balanced against the
complainant's right to equality and privacy. 71 But, until recently, in the
hierarchy of Chaiier rights, the accused rights to full answer and defense
have generally prevailed. Dawson argues that the jurisprudence
surrounding the accused's right to full answer and defense is legitimated
on notions of liberal legalism which are inherently androcentric, despite
pretensions to gender neutrality. She argues that "the 'constitutional
right to raise a doubt' on behalf of the individual accused appears to
overlook the collective origins and meaning of evidence." 72 To
overcome this dilemma, Dawson maintains that the legislative purpose
of the rape shield provisions gender equality - must be incorporated
into the analysis of fundamental justice and the accused's right to a fair
trial, at least in the context of a gendered crime of rape. Implicit in her
argument is the idea that women's perceptions of what is relevant must
be accounted for. This may mean shifting emphasis from values of
individualism, rationality and logic, which are traditionally associated
with liberal legalism to values of community responsibility and
emotions of care and connection. This shift in emphasis would give new
content to the meaning of 'fair trial', 'fundamental justice', and
'standards of relevance.' Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the
content of 'fair trial', 'full answer and defense' and 'fundamental
justice' in sexual assault cases are to be informed by the equality rights
70
The existence of "rape myths" in criminal prosecutions of such offenses was first
identified in Seabo.yer, ibid.
71
The court explicilty recognized this need to balance for the first time in R. v. 0 'Connor,
supra note 15. The issue in 0 'C01morwas whether and how an accused in a sexual assault case
should be able to gain access to the complainant's counseling and medical records where such
records are in the hands of a third party and are not a pati of the case to meet.
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T. Brettel Dawson, "Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of Primary Witnesses:
The Construction of Relevance" (1988) 2 Canadian Journal of Women's Issues 310.
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of the complainant. 73 Thus, the equality rights of the victim in cases of
sexual assault have now been constitutionalized and given status
equivalent to the rights of the accused. How the Mz'fls decision will
impact on that trial judge's use of discretion when balancing the rights in
any particular case remains to be seen.
The second problem with judicial discretion is the tendency for
judges to incorporate old legal forms into the new law. In enacting the
new sexual assault provisions, the legislators intended to create a new
legal regime in order to overcome culturally embedded notions of rape.
Arguably, judges are also influenced by the culture's rape myths and, as
a result, these myths impact on the exercise of judicial discretion. The
way in which rape myths can impact on legal (rather then purely factual)
findings is illustrated in the recent the case of R. v. Ewanchu!c 74 where
the issue before the court was the legal definition of consent. In the
Court of Appeal, McClung J.A., setting the context for his decision,
stated that: "it must be pointed out that the complainant did not present
herself to Ewanchuk or enter his trailer in a bonnet and crinolines;"75
and, that "she was the mother of a six-month-old baby and that, along
with her boyfriend, she shared an apartment with another couple." 76
Although this decision was not about evidence admissibility, it
demonstrates how judges often interpret the law in a way that imports
traditional understandings of rape and sexual assault. In her decision,
L'Heureux-Dube J. states:
Even though McClung J.A. assetied that he had no intention of
denigrating the complainant, one might wonder why he felt necessary
to point out these aspects of the trial record. Could it be to express that
the complainant is not a virgin? Or that she is a person of questionable
moral character because she is not married and lives with her
boyfriend and another couple? These comments made by an appellate
judge help reinforce the myth that under such circumstances, either the
complainant is less w01ihy of belief, she invited the sexual assault, or
her sexual experience signals probable consent to further sexual
activity. Based on those attributed assumptions, the implication is that
if the complainant mticulates her lack of consent by saying "no," she

R. v. Mills, supra note 68.
R. v. Ewa11chuk [1999) S.C.J. No 10.
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really does not mean it and even if she does, her refusal cannot be
taken as seriously as if she were a girl of "good" moral character. 77

The final area relevant to law reform is with respect to the issue of
consent. Consent seems to be firmly established within the legal
discourse, if not the philosophical one, as the defining feature of the
crime of rape. Nevertheless, consent cannot be seen as unproblematic.
The Criminal Code lays out circumstances in which the victim's consent
is vitiated, that is circumstances in which she cannot consent, for
instance, if she is in a state of intoxication. But the deeper meaning of
consent is not to be found in the legislative texts and has therefore been
left to the courts the elaborate. What is the measure of consent? Is there
an objective or implied consent in sexual activity? How do you
demonstrate consent? Clearly, this is an area where traditional legal
frameworks can intrude upon the law and stifle legislative reform.
Recently, in Ewanchulr, the Supreme Court clearly articulated its
position. With respect to the issue of consent, speaking for the majority
of the court, Major J. held that "for the purposes of determining the
absence of consent as an element of the actus reus, the actual state of
mind of the complainant is determinative. At this point, the trier of fact
is only concerned with the complainant's perspective. The approach is
purely subjective. " 78 With respect to this issue, the court was
unanimous. Major J. justified his position by stating:
The rationale underlying the criminalization of assault explains this.
Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both
physical and psychological, of every individual. Having control over
who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity
and autonomy. The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code
expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person
from any non-consensual contact or threats of force. 79

The approach taken by the courts is, in some ways, revolutionary, in that
it bases itself on a new model of sexual assault - "the communication
model." 80 Interestingly, however, is the way in which this new model is
77
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rooted in the traditional legal forms of liberalism, that is the protection
of physical integrity and autonomy.
The potential impact of this new model in other areas of the sexual
assault laws in substantial. The interplay between the consent and the
fault element is important here:
The criteria for mens rea, for the reasonableness of belief, and for
consent are closely related. For although a man's sincere belief in the
consent of his victim may be sufficient to defeat mens rea, the court is
less likely to believe his belief is sincere if his belief is not reasonable.
If his belief is reasonable, they are more likely to believe in the
sincerity of his belief. But evidence of the reasonableness of his belief
is also evidence that consent really did take place. For the very things
that make it reasonable for him to believe that the defendant consented
are often the very things that that incline the court to believe that she
consented. What is often missing is the voice of the women herself, an
account of what it would be reasonable for her to agree to, that is an
account of what ifreasonable from her standpoint. 81

This means that reconstituting notions of consent can also impact on the
content of the mens rea requirement. It can be argued, for instance, that
in many cases failure to communicate is not simply a negligent act on
the part of the part of the accused, but that it represents willful blindness
or recklessness. Such a shift in the content the me!ls rea requirement can
be said to be reflective of a shift in the cultural norms of sexual
encounters. If the communication model is legally (and culturally)
understood as standard practice in sexual encounters, lack of
communication on the part of the accused can be characterized as
evidence (although perhaps not conclusive evidence) of a guilty mind.
Likewise the shift in conceptual paradigms will, to some extent,
allow the court to bypass the constitutional dilemma with respect to the
admissibility of sexual history evidence. The question thus shifts from
an issue of constitutional admissibility to an issue of relevance. If the
question to be determined at trial is whether consent took place and
consent is judged by the type and quality of the communication between
the parties during the sexual encounter, then most of the evidence having
to do with the victim's past sexual history and lifestyle, particularly with
other partners, becomes irrelevant. New fo1ms of evidence will have to
be adduced:
81
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On the old model of aggressive seduction we sought evidence of
resistance. But on the new model of communicative sexuality what we
want is evidence of on-going positive and encouraging response on the
part of the plaintiff. This new model will require quite different tactics
on the part of cross-examiners, and quite different expectations on the
part of juries and judges. 82

Clearly, the full impact of the Ewanchuk decision is not yet known.
What is interesting, however, is the way in which both the courts and the
legislators have gradually taken up the criticisms posed by both radical
and liberal feminists and have transfo1med old ideologies of liberalism
and individualism into new conceptual frameworks.

It is il!teresti11g to
11011etlteless, wltat a rape law fimlled
around tlte ideal of sexual integrity a11d embodied auto11omy migltt
look like. The most obJ11o!ls cltange would be a move awayfi·om the
emphasis on lack cf consent as the central determincmt ol sexual
abuse. Ratlter tltese.femim:rt argume17/s would.favour a more complex
sexual assault law wl?iclt specifies particular conditzons under which
coercive, violent or degrading sex!lal encou11ters should be
prohibited This is not to say that the value ofsexual
would
dti·ect a ve1y great reliance on cnimi!Cllisa/1011 as a mode qfprotectti1g
tlte imagti1ary. On the contrmy, crimti!Cllisation is likely to be all
elJectiJJe dr!fe11der qfthe tinaginmy domain at the symbolic rather titan
the 1i1strume11tal level. F!lrthennore, thollgh lawyers are inclined to
lose sight qfthe obvious.fact, the most important comlil1ons.for sexual
equality and ti1tegrity lie 1i1 c!!ll!!rcll at!Iludes rather than coercive
legal rules.s.1

In January 1999, as an on-going effort at redrafting its Penal Code,
Finland introduced major revisions to its sexual offences laws. Chapter
20, which is now entitled 'Of Offences against Sexual Selfdetennination', covers offences relating to: rape and other fonns of
sexual coercion; sexual exploitation of children, the disabled and other
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vulnerable persons; as well as, sexual procurement or 'pimping' .84
Because of the novelty of these enactments, the practical effects of these
changes are still unknown. What will be examined in this paper,
however, are the legal and social forces that influenced the direction of
the cmTent legislation. One interesting aspect of the Finnish reforms is
that they are somewhat out of keeping with the country's larger penal
reform movement, which emphasizes decriminalization. In the area of
sexual offences, the scope of the law has actually increased. These
legislative changes have been infonned by a growing awareness by
Finnish scholars of feminist or 'women's law' issues.

Prior to the legislative reforms enacted in 1999, there were two
categories of crimes that could properly fall within the current scope of
the Canadian sexual assault provisions. 'Forcible rape', which was
punishable with up to I 0 years imprisonment, occurred when a women
was forced to have sexual intercourse 'by violence or by threat of an
imminent danger.' 'Sexual assault', which was punishable by fine or for
up to 4 years, occurred when a women was forced to have sexual
intercourse or some other indecency 'by violence or by threat. ' 85
It should be noted that in neither set of provisions was 'lack of
consent' a definitional element of the offence, nor, although formally
available to the accused as a justification, was it an arguable issue at
trial, despite regular pronouncements by the defendant that "she wanted
to". 86 Jaatinen argues that the penal code provisions are comprehensive
in their form and any that any discussion with respect to defenses, such
as consent or duress, are merely academic exercises. 87 The crime of rape
or sexual assault, however, is understood to be a crime against the selfdetennination of the victim. Therefore, lack of consent is an implicit
element of the offence. In addition, in the context of the presentation of
s-1 (Uno!Jlcio/) Feno/ Code of Finland (Ministry of Justice, Law Drafting Depmiment)
[unpublished].
Edward Wise, ed., The Fel!ol Code ofFinlolld Olld Related Lows, trans. Matti Joutsen,
(Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987).
86
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87
Telephone Interview with H. Jaatinen by D. Cashman (23 February 1999). Heikki
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evidence, many things at a practical level hinge on whether or not there
has been consent. 88 But these issues are rarely articulated using the
language of consent. Instead, the court focuses on the physical evidence,
as well as the conduct of the parties, in order to determine culpability.
The pivotal issue has typically not been consent, "but the nature of the
threat." 89 In Finland, 'taking advantage of someone who is unable to
defend himself/herself or to make or express a decision' falls under a
separate crime of 'sexual abuse,' 90 and this seems to care of those
circumstances where the victim's consent would said to be vitiated
under Canadian law (far example, in instances of intoxication). 91 The
issue of consent as justification or excuse is generally restricted to
"hockey, boxing, karate, and other contact sports where injuries
sometimes occur." 92 Koivula states:
About 400 rapes/year are reported to police and studies indicate that
the real figure could be as much as 1500. Among these 400 there are
possibly 5-10 cases where consent is even mentioned let alone taking
into consideration. These are usually cases where rape has not
occurred and the woman is after vengeance or money. Consent is
pretty hard to prove by the accused in a rape trial so it is a very rarely
tried by the defense. 93

Nousiainen argues that because consent is not a definitional aspect of the
offense in Finland, it makes it difficult to raise the issue as a defense. She
states:
I would say that [the fact that consent is not a definitional element] has
made it more difficult to point out the relevance of the discussion and
also to develop a rape specific discussion on the thing .. .I could say
that somehow it seems that we haven't been having a very good
discussion about the problems involved in these specific types of cases
compared to what is consent in some other contexts. It is a very
different thing if you are talking about consent to rough sport and so
on.94
88
Telephone interview with K. Nousiainen (7 March 2000). Kevat Nousianen is a
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The substantive highlights of the 1999 changes can be summarized
as follows. There are now four categories of offences that would attract
the Canadian sexual assault provisions. 'Rape', punishable for 1-6
years, is defined as forcing sexual intercourse by violence or threat of
violence. Included under this provision is causing an unconscious state
of mind and taking advantage of that state. 'Aggravated rape',
punishable for 2-10 years, occurs where there is rape and: a) there is
intent to cause bodily injmy, disease, or to endanger the victim's life; b)
many persons participated in the rape or the rape resulted in extreme
mental of physical suffering; c) the act was committed in a particularly
humiliating, harsh, or cruel manner; d) guns, knives or other deadly
weapon was used; or e) there were other circumstances considered to be
particularly harsh or brutal. 'Coerced sexual intercourse', punishable by
no more than 3 years, occurs where the violence or threat was marginal,
there were mitigating circumstances, or the threat used was not one of
violence. 'Coerced sexual activity', punishable by a fine or no more than
3 years in prison, occurs when sexual activities other than rape are
forced by violence or threat and the result is a violation of one's right to
sexual self-determination. The definition of intercourse has been
expanded to include non-vaginal penetration. Also, the language is now
gender neutral in its application. Prosecution with respect to the first two
offences is no longer at the discretion of the victim. It is also worth
noting that since 1994, marriage is no longer a defense to the crime of
rape.
When comparing the Finnish and Canadian legislation, several
differences emerge. As already noted, lack of consent is not a
definitional element of any of the sexual assault offenses under Finnish
legislation. Historically, 'use of force' was the essential and defining
feature of rape. Recognition of the inadequacy of such a narrow
definition of rape, however, helped to spur the recent legislative
refonns. The goal of the recent amendments was to broaden the scope of
the law, by criminalizing sexual acts in circumstances of sexual
coercion. Unlike the Canadian sexual assault provisions, which are
broadly drafted to include any non-consensual sexual act, the Finnish
law clearly sets out prohibited conditions and circumstances in the actus
reus of the offense. With respect to the crime of aggravated assault,
some attention is also paid to the injuries sustained by the victim as a
result from the offence. Also, the Finnish legislation clearly
distinguishes between criminal acts, which include penetration (of any
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"sexual organ"), and other sexual crimes. It is also worth noting the
lower maximum penalties for sexual crimes under the Finnish
legislation.
word needs to be said about the admissibility of evidence in
Finland. Finland, like other civil law jurisdictions, has a general rule of
'free evaluation of evidence.' This means that very little is excluded.
There is, however, no jury in Finland- cases are generally heard in front
of one professional judge, who directs the process, sitting with two lay
judges. Evidence of the complainant's general lifestyle and sexual
history is rarely adduced by the defense; it is generally not seen as
relevant. 95 In 1998, new criminal law procedures were introduced which
severely restricted the length of the trial process. This has also led to a
decrease in the use of sexual-history evidence by the defendant. 96 This
means that the problem of rape myths, as they have been described in
Canada, has not been an issue in Finland. What the comi does tend to be
evaluate, however, is the level of responsibility that the pariies should
assume. 97 How the pariies behaved, or should of behaved, becomes
relevant in this context. 98
Physical evidence is the primary mode of proof for the
prosecution. 99 In Helsinki, a specialized unit within the hospital has
been established to examine rape victims after a crime has been
reported. 100 Secondary sources of evidence include psychiatric evidence
of 'rape trauma syndrome', testimony from the victim's relatives and
friends with whom she may have confided after the rape, and the
victim's own testimony. 101 It is rare, however, except in cases where the
victim and the perpetrator are strangers (and the women's story is
presumed to be true), or the women's story is pariicularly compelling,
that the defendant will be convicted without physical evidence
supporting the victim's claim. Indirectly, then, the comi does consider
the issue of consent, although it is never ariiculated as such.
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It can be said that the new provisions, insofar as they relate to the
crimes of rape and the newly constituted crime of sexual coercion, do
not so much represent a change in philosophical direction of the core
content of the law, but, rather, represent a moderate expansion of
judicial authority. The new title to the Chapter, 'Of Offences Against
Sexual Self-Determination', for instance, although technkal{J:replacing
'Of Offences Against Morality' is simply a formal acknowledgment of
what has been clearly recognized by the courts and aiiiculated by the
Government Committees and the Law Reform agencies since the
1960s 102 that the trne violation resulting from the crime of rape is a
violation of the personal integrity of the individual women. 103 Whereas
in Canada, the legislative reforms have represented an ideological shift,
in Finland the reasons for the legislative amendments have been
articulated variously as 'to make it easier to prosecute rape', 'to bring
more cases to court', and 'to differentiate between crimes, providing
lighter sentencing in some cases, in order to convict more defendants.'
From a Finnish feminist perspective, the legal issues posed by the
criminalization of rape are significantly different than those posed by
Canadian feminists. In Canada, the major source of contestation
involves the definition of sexual assault and evidentiaiy issues are thus
engendered by concerns over these basic definitional questions. In other
words, questions about the relevance and admissibility of evidence
almost invariably concerns the way in which certain fonns of evidence
overdetem1ine how rape is ultimately defined, both in- and outside the
comiroom. In Finland, on the other hand, the problem of rape becomes a
problem of proof: "we see the problem ve1y much as a question of
evidence ... and there has been discussion of the problems that arise when
too much emphasis is put on the discussion of the violent character or
how the violence aspect is to be treated ... but the problems of evidence
are ve1y much in the foreground." 104 Thus, the changes that occurred
with respect to the definition of rape have had more to do with functional
purposes (that is, increasing the rates of criminal prosecution), than with
changing the core content of the law. While in some camps there were
Nousianen. supra note 89.
According to Nousiainen, the "de-dramatization", and I take her to mean the gradual
shift away from rape as a erime of shame and morality, has been oeeurring in the eourts for the
last 30 years.
104
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concerns about the symbolism attached to reducing the sentences for
acts of sexual aggression, it seems to be widely accepted that the new
laws, insofar as they increase prosecuting powers, are beneficial.
Nousiainen believes that one important issue that has not yet been
addressed in Finland and which may eventually become a part of the
legal debate has to do with the issue of the fault requirement and whose
interpretation of events is being considered in the evaluation of evidence
having to do with fault. Currently, intent is required to get a conviction.
She argues, however, that recklessness or negligence may be a better
measure of fault. This issue is presently being debated in other
Scandinavian countries.

2. Purposes of the Criminal Law in Finland
In order to understand the contextual differences between Canada
and Finland with respect to the way in which the crime of rape is
understood, both through law and general legal discourse, it is necessary
to say a word about the role of the criminal law in the context of a
Scandinavian welfare state. Nousiainen believes, for instance, that the
Finnish approach with respect to the purposes of the criminal law have
"influenced feminist criminologists so that it hasn't been possible ... to
demand for increased or harsher punishments, so that, I think, we have
been in a kind of tight position in that on one hand, saying women have
not been treated right or equally, or the female victims are not treated
well and, on the other hand, trying to say this in terms that are acceptable
in the welfare state type of criminal law discussion." 105
Since the 1970s, there has been a shift in the general penal
philosophy of Finland. As in other Scandinavian countries, Finland is
moving away from using the criminal law as an instrument for the
treatment or punishment of the offender. This is probably truer for
Finland, "which emphasizes shorter sentences and fewer
convictions,'' 106 than for any other country. Finland is very proud of the
fact, for instance, that it has been the only Western jurisdiction to have
actually reduced its prison population in the last number of years.
Anttila and Tornudd attribute this to the fact that:

ios Ibid.
106

Ibid.
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treatment ideology never had time to establish itself as the main
refonn ideology, It was weak during the 1940s and 1950s and when
the old guard relinquished its grip on power in the 1960s, the new
reformers had already adopted a critical stance towards both the
practice of coercive treatment and its background ideology, the
medical model of crime. 107
In a sense, Finland thus leaped-over the treatment stage in the
historical development of penal reform ideologies and went directly
towards a modem ideology, emphasizing both rationality in the form
of a general prevention and classic principles of justice ... The special
circumstances [of Finland], however, ensured that the justice
orientation is only a distant relation to, for example, the neoclassical
school of American origin. 108

Nousiainen argues that, in Finland, the use of criminalization as an
instrument of social control is restricted to "classical criminal law, with
a lot of demands placed on legality." This is because there is "an
understanding that the criminal law is something very bad in itself," and
should be seen as the "the last possible way of doing something to any
social problem." 109 Anttila and Tornudd state:
The evils of indeterminate incarceration under harsh discipline in
closed institutions operated by the social authorities enraged
intellectuals and human rights activists. Earlier claims for the
effectiveness of treatment (and punishment) became suspect in the
light of increased methodological sophistication and new research
findings. It is fair to say that the new generation of reformers which
entered the scene in the 1960s saw the ideology of coercive treatment
as one of their main foes. 110

The unique Scandinavian approach to the criminal law is consistent
with the general ideology of the welfare state and the creation of the
"public family." 111 The goals behind the welfare state can be
summarized in terms of the principles social justice. It is believed that
107
Inkeri Antilla & Patrik Tornudd, "The Dynamics of Finnish Criminal Code Reform" in
Raimo Lahti & Kimmo Nuotio, eds., Cnini11al Law ti1 Tra11silion:Ftimish and Comparative
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of California Pres, 1989).
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"[b ]y removing families from the vagaries of the market, by protecting
workers against arbitrary firings, by contributing to economic growth,
by creating equality in society as a whole and thereby reducing stress" 112
a type of social harmony can be achieved. Such harmony would reduce
social tensions, which are the general sources of criminal behaviour, and
would thereby reduce the need for the intervention of criminal law.
Thus, there is a social obligation to decrease criminality at its source.
For Finnish law reformers, who are schooled in sociology, the criminal
law "is not the proper vehicle for directing social change" 113 because the
"level of criminality in a society is primarily determined by factors other
than the threat of punishment." 114 For Finns, the social and economic
costs of using the criminal law as a mechanism of social change
generally outweigh its potential benefits.
Although there is a tendency towards abolitionism, 115 most Finns
believe that the criminal justice system has an important purpose, but
that it should be used sparingly. The purpose of the criminal law tends to
be symbolic, rather than practical, a social denunciation of activities so
morally repugnant, or socially damaging, that they deserve criminal
sanction. Anttila and Tomudd argues that:
to the extent that the criminal justice system does have an impact on
crime this effect is achieJJed through general prevelltioll mechanisms
(using this term i11 its exte11sive sense) rather than through
mechanisms ofe.g. deterrence or indiJJic!ua!preve11tion. The criminal
justice system should meet high standards of justice but the aim of the
system is not to do justice but to control human behaviour. While other
agencies of social control may be important, no society can manage
without a criminal justice system [emphasis added]. 116

The importance of the criminal system, then, relates to the "indirect" or
"symbolic" effects of criminalization. Under this model, using
individual offenders to promote social goals is morally unjustifiable.
Criminal punishment, in terms of the time spent in prison, should
therefore be limited.
112
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Finland's approach to the criminal law cannot be divorced from its
legal culture generally. It is significant, for instance, that Finland has a
very strong tradition of formal legalism and strict interpretation.
Pylkk:iinen 117 argues that historically Finland's strict approach to legal
interpretation was used to protect the country against the onslaught of
Russian imperialism. But whatever its historical roots, the country's
approach to legal interpretation, together with its distinctive
understanding of the proper purposes of the criminal law, has meant that
the evolution of sexual assault laws in Finland has been historically
distinct from that in Canada. In Finland, for instance, the recent
legislative reforms have tended to focus on drafting changes that would
have the effect of increasing the scope of the law in this area. It is
interesting to note that despite the general move towards decriminalization in Finland, the scope of the criminal law in the area of
sexual offences has actually increased. This anomaly is, as will be
shown, in large part due, to new social circumstances that have given
rise to increased reflection on notions of sexuality, and the state's role in
regulating sexual relationships. More importantly, however, is the
emerging phenomenon of 'women's law' in Scandinavian academic
circles, and the way in which this movement has created a social space in
which women can address issues that are unique to the particular
circumstances of 'womanhood.'

3. Sexuality and Gender in Finland
It is a popular stereotype that Scandinavian countries are sexually
promiscuous. This is largely inaccurate, however. 118 Finland, in
particular, has traditionally had a strong sexual ethic, grounded in the
country's agrarian roots. It can be argued that low levels of urbanization
are a key factor in the maintenance of traditional values. Even today,
Finnish urbanization has not occurred in a scale or in a manner seen in
116
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most industrialized societies. It would be fair to say that the Finnish
sexual ethic is quite different than the one found in Canada. It is based
on the traditional values of the countryside, rather than on Christian
morality. Christianity never established a firm hold on the Finnish
society. Not only did Christianity come late to Finland, but, during the
early period of welfare reform, the church was co-opted by the state.
Goran Gustafsson argues that the integration of the church into the state
apparatus occurred in order to secure the state's influence over the
institution, thereby effectively eliminating any competing ideologies. 119
Therefore, at an informal level at least, Finland is perhaps more
secularized than either Canada or the United States. 120
In Finland, sexual morality is not so much marked by strict rules of
conduct, culminating in prohibition, but rather by an ethic of
responsibility. Historically, marriage was not seen as a prerequisite for
sex, but sex was viewed as a precursor to marriage. It was common
practice for couples to formalize their union only after the birth of their
first child. 121 This does not mean that the society prescribed to an ethic
of promiscuity with free and casual sex. On the contrary, sex was only to
be undertaken in the context of an intimate and long-term relationship.
Honkatukia contends that the North American dating culture does not
exist in Finland. 122 This means that sexual encounters between men and
women do not have the same history of social regulation as they do in
Canada. In Finland, for instance, it is commonplace for a couple to be
introduced at a bar and then to go home together for coffee and
conversation, without expectation by either party that sex will take
place. 123 Sex, however, is seen as an integral part of the dating

Goran Gustaffson, "Politicization of State Churches: A Welfare State Model," (1990)
37:1 Social Compass 107.
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relationship from very early on and it is anticipated that women will
have several sexual relationships before marriage. 124
The absence of a restrictive code of sexual conduct means that the
'double standard,' a defining feature of traditional North American
sexual culture, has not been an issue in Finland. Empirical research has
found, for instance, that, at least historically, there was a greater
acceptance of the non-virginity of one's sexual partner in Scandinavian
than in North American society. 125 The institution of the sauna in
Finland also serves to counter sexual modesty and improve a spirit of
openness. It can be argued that Scandinavian sexuality was never
repressed nor viewed as a dangerous social contagion that it has in
traditional Christian societies. Instead of a double standard, sexuality in
Scandinavian countries is marked by a single standard and supported by
an ethic of responsibility. Moreover, these values are consistent with the
principles of equality and social justice found in the modem welfare
state.
It can, perhaps, be argued that where issues of sexuality were
largely repressed in North American culture, they were normalized, and
thus made invisible, in Scandinavian society. Recently, however, with
the break-up of the Soviet Union, rings of organized prostitution, run by
the Russian mafia, have made their way into Finland and have spurred
debate about what it means to be sexually determining. 126 In many ways,
the introduction of prostitution into Finnish culture makes sexual
vulnerability a visible issue. Moreover, Nousiainen argues that this
increase in visible prostitution has impacted on the male-female
dynamic. She states:
it has become much more difficult for women to uphold sexual selfdetermination as it has become much more common, for example, that
you are bothered in the street, and you also may be bothered also in the
restaurants if you are sitting alone, or with other women, you are very
often addressed in a way that really didn't occur in the eighties. And
/bid.
Harold Christensen and Christina Gregg, "Changing Sex Norms in America and
Scandinavia" in Robert Bell & Michael Gorden, eds., Tlte Social Dime11sioll o/ Human
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there has been quite a lot of talk, for example, about the way children
seem to behave in the schools. It is very typical today that boys, for
example, call girls whores, which, as far as we know, wasn't very
typical ten years ago, let's say. That way of talking about girls seems to
have become really very common. Of course, it is difficult to say what
are the reasons, and what are the causes, and what are the results, but
there has been a change. 127

Thus, whereas in the past issues of sexuality were largely invisible and
noncontroversial in Finland, they have recently become the centre of
social debate. Coincidently, the rise of prostitution in Finland has
coincided with the Scandinavian women's law movement, which is an
attempt to bring a women-centered perspective to political and legal
discourse.

Emergence of Women's Law
4. Feminism in
Julkunen argues that "the concept of individual rights has never
been as important in Nordic countries as in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Constitutional rights are not invoked here, as in the United States." 128
Although the concept of individual rights and libe1iies is accepted as
noncontroversial in the Scandinavian context, the emphasis has tended
to be on the protection of "social rights guaranteed minimum income,
employment, education and health- [those things which] make citizens
free and equal." 129 This has meant that "[e]quality between classes has
been the principle and guiding rational for the Nordic welfare state" 130
and traditionally women have had to invoke this conceptual framework
in order to pursue their interests and views.
Because of its emphasis on equality, and what this has meant in
terms of women's basic social needs, Finland is often cited by
international agencies as being the best place in the world for women to
live. Julkunen argues that women's equality with men is the result of
Finland's unique history, which laid the groundwork for "structures and
mentalities conducive to equality between the sexes." She argues that
historically:
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[w]omen's labour was indispensable in agrarian communities and the
low salaries of male workers in combination with only rudimentary
health and social security forced wives to work outside the home. The
absence of the traditional male breadwinning role prevented the
development of a strong patriarchal culture with its associated
institutions. 131

Scandinavian countries, in general, are characterized as the 'weak male
breadwinner' or 'dual breadwinner' societies. As a result, in
Scandinavia, gender categories are generally more fluid than they are in
North America:
The space within which we as gendered beings can manuoeuvre is
fairly wide in our (Scandinavian) culture ... Here a personal mixture of
gender symbols in conduct and attitudes is acceptable, on condition
that certain prescribed limits are observed or certain ceremonial rituals
are performed. 132

It needs to be clarified that, at least in Finland, the political focus

has traditionally "centred on equalizing differences between social
classes, regions and the sexes. At the same time, however, minority
rights and human rights have not been well protected." 133 This is
impmiant to understand because the paradox of the Finnish emphasis on
equality is that, in many ways, it tends to subve1i considerations of
difference. Pylkkanen states: "[e]quality policies have concentrated on
administrative measures against discrimination mostly in working life,
and in allocating some resources to women's studies, but is
characteristic of Finland that a public discourse of gender equality - or
rather gender differences - has nevertheless been extremely limited." 134
In homogeneous Finland, any fo1m of difference, unless based in class
inequality, is viewed with suspicion. Moreover, the politics of
consensus and social ham1ony, which are the dominant features of the
Finnish social and political structures, has further marginalized
discourses of difference. Korvajarvi argues, for instance, that the
subversion of difference between the sexes determines the character of
the Finnish workplace:
Ibid at 5.
Lis H0jgaard, "Working Fathers Caught in the Web of the Symbolic Order of Gender"
( 1990) 4(3) Acta Sociologica 245 at 248.
133 Julkunen, supra note 128 at 6.
134
Supra, note 117.
131

132

158-DALHOUSIEJOURNALOF LEGAL STUDIES

There is little Finnish precedent when it comes to major public
conflicts between women and men ... As a general rule ... women and
men strive to avoid gender-based conflicts, preferring instead to work
for mutual hannony. This also contributed to an image of successfully
achieved equality between women and men in working life. It is
further promoted the notion that sexuality and gender do not belong in
working life ...
Those who still dare to oppose gender equality are few and far
between. At the same time, gender equality and the related aspects of
gender neutrality have led to the avoidance of official conflicts
between women and men ... Harmony nonetheless has a way of hiding
actual gendering practices in working life. It is difficult for both
women and men to conceive of forms of gendering in working life
because they can even elude verbalization. Events and processes speak
for themselves here. It is culturally problematic for women to view
themselves as "women", above all else. Instead they prefer to identify
themselves as "workers" or "human beings." 135

This principle of gender neutrality has also impacted legal
discourses in a broad range of areas. Julkunen argues, for instance, that
"Finland's permissive Abortion Act was not justified in terms of
women's rights but in terms of public health and of equality between
social classes and regions." 136 In other words, it was argued that poorer
women, living in remote districts, "should not be forced to give bi1ih to
unwanted children or to undergo illegal abortions that have adverse
effects on health." 137 Julkunen goes on to state that:
discussions of sexual harassment, rape, wife abuse and the sexual
coercion of wives have continued to suffer the fate of suppressed,
almost taboo subjects in Finland. These family violence phenomena
cannot be seen as cases of class or regional inequality as can abmiion.
Family violence occurs in all social categories, which makes it
essentially an issue centred on the relationship between the sexes. 138

The slow emergence of 'women's law' 139 during the last decade
can best be described by the oft quoted passage of Tove Dahl who says
Piiivi Korvajiirvu, "Gendering Practices in Working Life" in Finnish Perspectiws
(Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996) 11at14-15.
136
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that the purpose of women's law is "to describe, analyze, explain and
understand the legal status of women in order to improve their status in
law and in society in general." 140 Women's law involves moving
beyond doctrines of gender neutrality in order to meet the needs of a
gender-specific reality. In particular, women's law has been interested
in the way in which the instruments of the welfare state can be used to
improve women's lives. Importantly, women's law is not simply a legal
discourse. Rather it is has been systematically incorporated into a
broader philosophical frameworks and has become a part of a larger
feminist strategy. Pylkkanen argues, however, that the women's
movement poses special challenges for the science of law, which has
been dominated by a legal culture that is "young, positivist, and
male." 141
It is within the analytic framework of women's law that the issue of
violence against women is currently being debated. Dahl states:
"protection against violations of integrity has been in the centre of
woman's politics the last few years, and women studies have
contributed by revealing the nature and extent of these violations,
analyzing their effects, and suggesting refonns." 142 Nousiainen states
that today "questions of violence against women occupy our time
here." 143 Women's law has thus created a discursive space within which
the issue of rape can be released from the proverbial closet. Feminist
have recently begun to address, for instance, the issue of why "few
[rape] cases are prosecuted", despite high rates of attacks. 144 This has
meant changes to the definitional aspects of rape, in order to overcome
evidentiary obstacles. The new legislative scheme has therefore
attempted to clearly articulate the conditions under which rape is said to
occur, thereby extending the arm of the law to a broader range of
prohibited acts. In addition, at least in regard to the more serious
University Press, 1988); Hane Petersen "On Women and Legal Concepts: Infonnal Law
and the Nonn of Consideration," (1992) I Social and Legal Studies 493; Agnette Weis
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offenses, the decision to prosecute is no longer at the discretion of the
victim for fear that she may be "intimidated" or "paid off'. 145 This does
not mean, however, that the criminal law is seen as a panacea. Feminists
continue to be deeply influenced by the Scandinavian penal philosophy,
which restricts the use of the criminal law:
In the last few years the question of what criminal law responses could
most effectively deter sexual offences has aroused considerable
debate. Researchers in woman's law have in this context relied upon
the general conviction in criminology and criminal law that increased
punishment seldom lead to a change of conduct in an area like this and that a change in conduct must despite everything be the main
objective. For rape victims the legal system will seldom involve
res ti tuti on. 146

As an alternative to the singular focus on criminal conviction, women's
groups, as well as Finland's Department of Health, both contribute
resources to providing therapy to women victimized by violence. 147 In
addition, women's groups devote some of their budgeted resources to
obtaining higher compensation and damage awards for victims of rape
related offenses. 148
One interesting aspect of the women's law movement in Finland is
that, as a source of social critique, it has largely emerged from within
state institutions. Pylkkanen states that "the pursuit of equality ... has
been very much connected with the state, at the same time that it has
been an academic discipline. Since the 1960s era of state feminism, a
women's movement separate from the state has been almost nonexistent."149 Pylkkanen argues that the movement's inextricable link to
the state has weakened the scope of its critique because it provides no
external opposition to existing legal institutions. The context of
legislative reform in Finland has thus been very different that that which
has occmTed in Canada where feminists have actively engaged in
debates about the legitimacy of the legal foundations upon which the
sexual assault laws have been built. 150 Pylkkanen states:
Steinburg, supra note 86.
Dahl ( 1988), supra note 139 at 103.
147
Nousianen, supra note 88. Most of these resources tend to do to victims of domestic
violence, but increasing rape victims also have access to these resources.
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In the Finnish tradition, there is a strong tendency to negotiate and be
constructive instead of being radical. Instead of strong individualism,
communitarian values still dominate. I would say that a negotiation of
meanings is going on all the time, not struggle. Feminist research and
theory cannot develop without specific institutional forms, but unlike
many others, Finns always want to integrate and avoid overt
controversy. 151

Pylkkiinen argues that "[a]lthough practitioners of women's law do also
engage in official equality policies and administration, it is even more
important !for them/ to develop a specific critical approach to legal
science and the legal system itselfas a whole' [emphasis added]. 152
Pylkkiinen states:
With its theoretical emphasis, Finnish feminism within law is less
pragmatic and in a sense less radical than in many other countries. But
I would like to stress that maybe this approach is even more radical
with its aims at redefining many aspects of the mainstream legal
science itself. We do not want to accept descriptions of 'gender' or
'equality' as defined in current cultural and legal codes but try instead
to find ways to redefine them to get distance from dichotomous
heterosexist thinking of gender as well as rationalities in the liberal
thinking of justice. 153

Thus, in Finland, the issue is not changing heterosexual norms as they
are understood within North American culture. Honkatukia argues that
this is because the paradigm of gender neutrality has served Finnish
women well and, as a result, issues that could potentially harm gender
hannony have been avoided. 154 The process of legislative refonn has
therefore been less radical in Finland than in Canada. The issues raised
by woman's law include: 'what are the paiiicular needs of women as a
group?' 'how are men and women differently effected by their social
interactions?,' and 'in what ways can the law be used to deal with the
particular circumstances in which women find themselves?' One area
that was not addressed by the recent reforms, which primarily focused
hardly any discussion around rape, and it has been only in the 1990's that violence against
women in general has been recognized as a social problem in public discussions ... Recently,
'pminer violence' has raised a lot of attention, but the issue of rape has not been talked about."
151
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152
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153
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on evidentiary rather than definitional problems, concerns the issue of
fault and whose understanding of the events is emphasized when
evaluating evidence pertaining to fault. Although this issue has not yet
reached a level of debate of any significance in Finland, it is an issue that
is appropriate to the content of the women's law movement.

IV. RAPE

IN

p AKISTAN:

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Islamist women I spoke to saw rape as a symptom qf the lack qf
religious values in the society. It was mgued that rape was tinported
into cultural value systems along with other cultural li1stitutions it is
alien to the Islamic culture... According to some Islamist women, the
only way to eradicate rape was to re-educate 1J1e11, women and
children about Islam a!ld thus re-instate Islamic values and morality.
Any other 1J1ea11s, especially the existing penal code, are sztpe1jlcial
and i/1(!/fective. 155

Since partition in 1947, Pakistan has struggled to create an identity
for itself. In a 1999 report for CBC's Ideas, reporter Liza Hebert stated:
"Pakistan was established as a country for Muslims and has evolved
further into a Muslim country. Critics say Pakistan is moving very close
to a theocratic state." 156 In order to understand the origins of the
Pakistani rape laws, it is necessaiy to have an understanding of the role
that such laws play under Islam. Tohidi states:
Some Western-oriented feminists may find it difficult to accept the
fact that in many 'Third World' countries ... women-and many men as
well-value the interests of their families more than their own selfinterests ... Many women in developing countries, however, although
wanting to ensure that their rights are respected and acknowledged,
cannot afford or are unwilling to assert women's rights in a way that
'estranges them not just from their family but also from the larger
community.' 157

Because of the symbolic role that women have been given in Islam, the
struggle over Islamization is, at one level, a gender struggle. Few would
Azza Karam FVome11, Islam isms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
156
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withi11 Unify (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998) at 282.
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disagree with the statement that the current rape laws do injustice to
women. In fact, one Islamic fundamentalist, when asked by interviewer
Liza Hebe1i whether the current rape laws in Pakistan were working,
admitted they were not- but went on to argue that the problem was not
the laws themselves, but the fact that the sharia has not yet been fully
integrated into Pakistani culture and legal institutions. 158 Given the
current political climate in Pakistan, the success at any attempt at legal
reform will almost invariably depend upon whether such reforms have
foundations in Islamic law. In Pakistan, religion, politics, and law are
inseparable.

1. Islam: A religion of the Law
Joseph Schacht, in a paper exploring the historical relationship
between theology and law in Islam, begins by stating that "[i]t is a
truism to say ... that Islam is a religion of the Law" 159 and later argues
"[ f]rom its very beginnings Islam was a religion of action rather than
belief." 160 It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the profound
implications that this has for the Islamic state in the modern world.
However, it is necessary to understand some of the more specific
consequences that it has for the criminal law in order to do an analysis of
rape in the Islamic state of Pakistan. Sandeela 161 provides a useful
analytic framework; he defines the sharia in the following terms simultaneously as "Divine Law", "Revealed Law'', "Founded Law",
"Unchanging Law", "Natural Law", "Comprehensive Law", and "Open
Textured Law".
Islam is comprehensive, in that "the sacred or religious law of
Islam does not only consist of legal rules in the narrow sense, as we
understand them; it is an all-embracing body of religious duties, the
totality of Allah s commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all
aspects." 162 It is comprehensive in the sense that it incorporates both a
public and a spiritual function. The public function, which governs the
Supra note 156.
Joseph Schacht in G.E. von Grunebaun, ed., Theology and law in /slam (Weisbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1971) 3 at 3.
160
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relationship between men, is connected to the spiritual, which is to
purify the soul from the baser instincts in preparation for the afterlife.
The two are connected, as will be demonstrated, through the concept of
umma or the collective identity of Islam. Under Islam, there is no
separation of the public and private, as it is understood in North
American legal culture.
Islamic law is both revealed and divine law, its primary sources
being the Qur an, the "True Word of God", and the Sunna of the Prophet
Mohammed whose life gave effect to God's rules as they are prescribed
in the Qur an. The role of.fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, has been deeply
influenced by the law's divine aspect:
There was a suspicion of theological speculation in the minds of many
leading Muslims. Theological speculation implied the use of human
reasoning, and it was one thing using one's reasoning to safeguard
against oneself from unwittingly transgressing Allah '.r commands, as
the ancient specialist in religious law used to do, and quite a different
thing trying to pry into the secrets, for instance, of God's nature and
predestination. 163

Fiqh is the preeminent Islamic science insofar it elaborated God's divine
law. "The purpose of .flqh was to produce pious deeds, and not
familiarity with legal rules and traditional knowledge." 164 It is the
instrument through which man can obey God's command. Islamic law is
also founded and unchanging law, insofar as it neither "evolved from
historical antecedents" 165 nor is evolutionary in character. The law,
however, is open-textured in that there are few "firm rules", leaving
space for (jtihad, the exercize of judicial reasoning.

2. Sources

Islamic Criminal Law
Sharia is the term used to identify the divine law. In particular, it
refers to "the laws and way of life prescribed by Allah for his
servants." 166 As has already been stated, the Shari'a is a comprehensive
system oflaw, which is not simply concerned with prohibitions but with
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issues of "ideology and faith; behaviour and manners; and practical
daily matter." 167 There are five general sources of Islamic law: 168 the
Qur an, which is quite literally "the Word of God'', "revealed to the
Prophet Muhammad for governing man's behaviour" and his "social
and religious life"; the Szmna, which is "the authentic tradition of the
Prophet Muhammad" and includes both his "sayings in specific cases
and his conduct in specific situations"; //ma, which refers to the
consensus of Muslim scholars; /jtihad, which refers to judicial
interpretation; and qztisas, which refers to "juristic analogy."
There is an issue over the legitimacy of modem penal codes, even
with respect to those that base themselves on the shari a. 169 On the one
hand, the role of the state is to defend the religion and to enforce God's
laws. 170 On the other hand, the 01ihodoxy of the penal codes is in
question. This issue was addressed in Pakistan in the context of the Zina
Ordi12ance a few years after the law was enacted. 171 In 1981, in Hazoor
Bakhsh v. Federation qf Paldsta11, the Federal Shariat Court had to
address the question of whether the punishment of rajm, stoning, is
ordained in Qur cm for zziia (illicit sexual intercourse). The court took
the unpopular position that it did not, but their judgment led to a reconstitution of the court. In 1982, the decision was reconsidered and the
new court, applying the constitutional-law doctrine of eclipse,
overturned the earlier decision.
At a general level, the degree to which the shari'a can and should
be used as a resource for feminists issues is hotly debated. Abdella
Doumata states:
Muslim society has a built in mechanism for promoting the human
rights of its people, and that is the holy law, the s!?ari 'a. It is a
mechanism that can be used on behalf of human rights, not because it
is fixed or God-given, but because it is in fact flexible, allowing for
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interpretation by men and women, and adoptable to changing needs
and changing cultural understandings. 172

But Abdella Doumata's view is not a universal one. The first question
that arises is the extent to which the content of Islamic law can give a
voice to modern feminist concerns. Some view Islam as inherently
oppressive to women, citing Qur anic verses that subordinate women to
their husbands, giving men the right, for instance, to "discipline" their
wives. Most, however, prefer to focus on the 'revolutionary' aspects of
the religion, highlighting the fact that the spirit of Islam was to free
women from the constraints imposed on them in pre- Islamic
societies. 173 They point to the fact that under Islam, men and women
were granted equality before God, with women given special status as
mothers. Moreover, under Islamic law, women were granted legal
independence, including the right to hold their own property in their
own name, as well as the right to consent to mmTiage. The second issue,
closely related to the first, is the extent to which feminists should use
Islamic law to give voice to their concerns. For Gardezi, 174 for instance,
women's rights have their origins in secular human rights and the use of
Islam to justify such rights gives an unwarranted legitimacy to Islamic
fundamentalism by inadvertently making Islam the framework of
analysis.
A third issue that arises is the extent to which the doors of the
[jtihad - juridical reasoning
are open to re-interpretation.
Traditionally, it has been held that since the third century of hil:A "all
jurists were... muqallids, that is those whose duty it is to accept the
opinions of the great predecessors without the exercise of private
judgment." 175 In other words, it was believed that the various schools of
Islamic thought had been crystallised and the faculty of fjtihad put into
abeyance. An-na'im argues, however, that:
172
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[a]s a product of human interpretation, sharia should be seen as an
inherently and constantly evolving and changing ethical and legal
system, and each generation of Muslim men and women have the
right, indeed obligation ... to contribute to that process in terms of their
own historical context. 176

She goes on to say, however,
that the process of reinterpretation of Islamic sources will not achieve
significant results if it is confined to marginal 'refonn' with the
jurisprudential and methodological framework of shari 'a as
established by the founding jurists, commonly known as usu! al-:fiqh,
the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. The process of
reinterpretation must include the assumptions and methodology of
traditional formulation, as well as the content of the principles and the
rules of the shari 'a. 177

There are also differing opinions among the different schools of Islamic
jurisprudence regarding the possibility of continuing [jtihad. In
Pakistan, the government belongs to the Hanqfi school, which has left
the door open for possible reinterpretation of Islamic law in the context
of contemporary social conditions. There is a large contingent of Shi'ite
Muslims within the country who consider the era of fjtihad as having
closed. The government has thus been inconsistent in its approach,
variously appealing to fjtihad and applying a strict traditional Shi'ite
interpretation of the law when it is convenient to do so. Weiss argues
that the rigid interpretation of the conservative school has dominated the
programme of legal refonn in Pakistan. 178

3. Categories of Offences and the Crime of Zina
There are three categories of crime under Islamic law. Unlike
western law, which distinguishes wrongful acts in terms of concepts of
public and private law, Islamic categories directly con-espond to the
three types of penalties available: hadd (pl. hudud), ta 'zir (pl. ta 'azh),
and qisas. 179 Hudud punishments, which form the basis for the Islamic
176
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penal code in contemporary Pakistan, represent the limits of acceptable
penal sanctions. Hudud is meted out for the commission or omission of
an act that is in contradiction to any divinely ordained command for
which a hudud punishment is explicitly laid out. There are seven crimes
to which hudud punishments are attached: adultery (zina), theft (sariqa),
banditry (lzaraba), defamation (qadij), transgression (baghi), drinking
alcohol (shorb al-khamr), and apostasy (ridda). Because hudud crimes
are regarded as being against God's commands, they are considered
absolute, rather than discretionary, and they serve as the limits of
punishment that can be imposed on the ta 'zir category of crime. Ta 'azir
crimes are those for which the means of punishment is not spelled out in
the Qur 'an or Sunna and is, instead, left to the discretion of the judge.
The lawfulness of ta 'zir is indicated by the Tradition of the Prophet.
Finally, the law of qisas concerns laws of retaliation and blood money.
The relationship between the offences is an imp01iant one to
understand. Rosen describes the logic of the hadd-tazir distinction in the
following manner:
Acts that are subject to discretionary remedies have in common that
they break the continuity of a relationship forged by human beings as
proprietary creatures in such a way that it is nevertheless possible to
reconstitute ongoing relationships without having to consider their
impact on society at large. The ha1111 these acts cause is, in a sense,
limited by the break in continuity of relationship which a properly
chosen remedy could help to reconstruct. Hadd-type wrongs go
beyond this boundary insomuch as, in the Islamic concept, they not
only intrude on a domain marked out by God but because that domain
is perceived as fraught with vast potential for social chaos. It is a realm
of acts in which the reconnecting of bonds is regarded as particularly
difficult and in which the systematic repercussions for many other
networks of obligation are difficult to foresee and control 180
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Sherwani distinguishes the three offences in the following manner:
{]isas being a retaliatory measure satisfies the psychological urge of

revenge; Httdud helps the prevention of crimes by providing severe
punishment to hardened, incorrigible and habitual criminals and
deterrence to other notorious members of the community; while Ta zzi·
aims at reforming the character of the culprit and his rehabilitation in
the society. 181

Sherwani's characterization of hadd as based on "the principle of
deterrence" with "its main objective [being] the prevention of crimes
and the protection of civil life" 182 is an interesting one because it
demonstrates the role that hadd punishments play in maintaining the
Symbolic Order of Islamic society. Sherwani goes on to say that in the
case of hadd, "the interest of the individual (the criminal in question)
should, in part, be sacrificed to protect the larger interests of the
community .. .It is essential to curb the ferocity of crimes for the sake of
protection of the society." 183 Similarly Rosen states: "the establishment
of a haddwrong removes the individual from further consideration as a
person (in the Arab sense) since direct reintegration is regarded as far
more difficult ... justice is rendered ... by the very act of
depersonalization .. [or] in the withdrawal of sociality through
depersonalization." 184 In the case of zzna, where the prescribed
punishment is death by stoning, the symbolic expression of the law is
materially significant because:
[i]n and through the act of stoning, the sense of outrage is at once
expressed and inculcated. Not only does the individual paiticipate
directly and deliberately in the administration of justice but also
affirms his own commitment to its ideal and expectations. Not only
does he tender his services to the upkeep of the social, political and
legal ethic, but also trains his own and others' sentiments and
sympathies aright. Only thus can the moral sense of the community be
kept keenly alive, and the strength and purpose imparted to the
administration of justice. 185
181
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In context of symbolic meaning, the distinction between qisas and
hudud crimes is also an important one to emphasize. The penalties for
hadd and qisas are prescribed by God and are therefore, to use Weiss'
language, "a violation of his rights. " 186 With hudud offences, however,
the interests protected:
transcend the interests of the individuals qua individuals, and as such
they can, given the non-recognition of corporate persons be
maintained only with reference to divine rights. Thus fornication
... and false accusation of fornication are both offences against God
because they undermine God's ordaining of marriage as the means for
legitimate procreation and perpetuation of the family across
generations. Theft is an offence against God because it militates
against the security of property upon which the well-being of the
family and society depends. The drinking of intoxicating beverages is
an offence against God because it interferes with rationality, which is
an essential ingredient of social order and of proper worship of God
and the disposition of the assets that he has conferred upon his human
creatures. 187

The qisas offences of homicide and bodily harm, however, fall into the
category of private law insofar as the effect the individuals' rights vis-avis each other. The difference between these two categories of offences
is illustrated by the story, reported in the books of Traditions of the boy
who had the affair with his employer's wife. The father of the boy gave
one hundred goats and a maid in compensation, which the employer
accepted. When the case was reported to the prophet, however, he
ordered the return of the goats and the maid and held both the boy and
the wife liable to hadd i&s'
The crime of zziza (illicit sexual intercourse) is seen as the most
heinous under Islamic law because of the disruption it causes to the
family, and thereby to the society at large. 189 The Qur 'an says:
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188
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"Nor come nigh to adultery,
For it is a shameful (deed),
And evil opening the road
(To other evils)." 190

There numerous references in the primary sources to zina, but there
is some inconsistency with respect to the appropriate penalties. For
example, the Qur 'an prescribes:
"The woman and the man,
Guilty of adultery or fornication,
Flog each of them,
With a hundred stripes." 191

Despite the Qur 'anic prescription, there are accounts in the Szmna
of offenders being stoned to death. Traditionally these inconsistencies
have been resolved by differentiating between muhsan (married) and
non-muhsan offenders, where stoning was reserved for the former, more
serious offense. Mayer 192 claims, however, that this issue was never
completely resolved in the flqh and this has led to the emergence of
different sanctions for zina in the various Islamic states.
Despite its harsh penalties, the hadd punishment for zina are rarely
carried out because of the evidentiary burden. In order for hadd to be
inflicted, either the crime must be confessed to or the act of intercourse
itself has to be witnessed by four tazkiyah-a!-shuhood(adult, male pious
witnesses). In addition, qadf?f, or defamation, meaning to falsely charge
someone with adultery, is also subject to hadd The Qur 'an states:
"Those who slander chaste women,
Indiscreet but believing,
And cursed in this life,
And in the Hereafter,
For them is a grievous penalty." 193
"And those who launch,
A charge against a chaste woman,

Omar al-Mutrak in Tahir Mahmood et al, eds., Cnimim! Low ti1 /slam one! !Ile 1v/11s!ti11
World (Dehli: Institute for Objective Studies, 1996) 213.
191
/bid, at 215.
192
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Shariah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?"
in Nicholas Heer, ed., /slomic Low 011ti Jurispntc!ence (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1990).
193
/bid. at 220.
190

172-DALHOUSIEJOURNALOFLEGALSTUDIES

And produce not four witnesses,
(To support their allegations),
Flog them with eighty stripes;
And reject their evidence,
Ever after; for such men are wicked transgressors,
Unless they repent thereafter,
And mend (their conduct),
For God is Oft-Forgiving
Most Merciful." 194

Together, these obstacles to proof suggest that the punishment for zina
has a more symbolic significance than a practical one. It should be noted
that there is not a separate offence of rape in the primary sources. But
under Islamic principles of justice, there is a concept of personal
responsibility, which includes some notion of criminal intent so that the
rape victim herself cannot be found guilty of zina. 195

Symbolic Position

Women

In order to understand the internal coherence and logic of Islamic
law, it is necessary to say a word about the umma, or the collective
identity of Islam. Memissi argues:
Individualism, the person's claim to have legitimate interests, views
and opinions different from the group, is an alien concept and fatal to
the highly collectivist Islam. Islam like any theocracy, is grouporiented, and individual wishes are put down as impious, whimsical,
egotistical passions 196

Whereas in Western liberalism, where the individual becomes "the basic
unit of moral, social, political, and legal analysis," 197 in Islam, the
individual is subsumed within the collective umma. The emphasis on
personal status as a marker of legal rights is a manifestation of this
prioritization of the umma as the proper source for subjective identity.
H.A.R. Gigg describes the concept best:
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In its internal aspect, the Umma consists of the totality of individuals
bound to one another by ties, not of kinship or race, but ofreligion, in
that all its members profess their belief in one God, Allah, and in the
mission of his prophet, Muhammad ... In its external aspect, the Umma
is sharply differentiated from all other social organizations. Its duty is
to bear witness to Allah in the relations of its members to one another
and with all mankind. They form a single indivisible unit charged to
uphold the true faith, to instruct men in the ways of God, to persuade
them to be good and to dissuade them from evil by word and deed. 198

Memissi argues that this concept of umma "transformed a group of
individuals into a community of believers." 199 Moreover, the politics of
identity that are occmTing in the Muslim world today draw upon this
concept of umma, as is demonstrated by what Mernissi calls "the need to
be Muslim."
It is important to understand that for Muslims, in canying out the
precepts of divine law, they are simultaneously bearing witness to Allah
and preserving the umma, their collective identity. Rosen states:
For the Arabs it also follows that what matters most in evaluating actions
is not their connection to a series of abstract propositions that lie behind
them but to the consequences that actions have in the world, their impact
on the networks of relationship, those webs of obligation, that one
constantly encounters reference to the effect that words and deed have in
the world as the means for assessing what they really are. And in law it is
the consequences of an act, rather than its antecedent precepts, in terms
of which a logic ofremedy will be fashioned. Indeed, because the harm
that people can do varies with their knowledge and hence their
connections to others the evaluation of the hann itself turns in so small
part on assessment of a person's situated ties. 200

The purpose of Islamic law is to prevent the social oppression that
occurs when "the greed and selfishness of the human prey upon
society."201 Under Islamic law, the notion of social justice depends upon
"the absolute, just, and coherent unity of existence, and the general,
mutual responsibility of individuals and societies."202
198
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In Islam, the family and not the individual becomes the primary
unit of identification, because it is in the family that the collective
identity of Islam is reproduced. "Prophet Muhammad advised his
followers to choose their partners carefully because the family .. .is the
backbone of society."203 It is not surprising, then, that many authors
have described the family as the "heart of the shari 'a ". Ahmed says of
Islamic societies that they:
have remained strictly mmTiage-oriented and conspire relentlessly to
round up every bachelor into the matrimonial fold. To begin, there is
Prophet Muhammad's decree that marriage is the only road to
viriue .. .Islam also prohibits celibacy. The prophet said: 'There is no
celibacy in Islam. ' 204

In Islam, marriage is too important to leave entirely to the whims of the
individual. In the Hanqfi school, for instance, the concept of a kqfa 'a
allows a woman's guardian to dissolve a maiTiage contract where the
girl chooses to marry beneath herself, or more particularly beneath her
family. 205 Mernissa argues that "[o]ne of the most enduring
characteristics of [early Islamic] history is that the family structure,
because divine, is assumed to be unchangeable." 206
One sees God's interest in the family as the social unit extending
into the area of the criminal law by virtue of the crime of ztiza. Several
authors have argued that the family was the instrument whereby the first
Muslim community was founded in Medina because the family
institution made it possible to organize a "society of believers" by
disrupting the pre-Islamic tribal system. The goal was to re-orient men's
allegiances away from the tribe to Allah. This was accomplished by
replacing the tribe with the collective umma. The primary social unit
within this collective became the family. There is a growing body of
research that suggests that in pre-Islamic society, there existed a strong
matrilineal, matrifocal system of kinship alongside the patrilineal one
and women's sexual freedom was its defining feature. Such freedom
203
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served as an impediment to the establishment of the Islamic patriarchal
structure, so, to use the words of Ghada Karmi, "Islam ensured the
ascendancy of the patrilineal over matrilineal marriage by condemning
all forms of the latter as fornication, zina." 207
Memissi argues that:
because of the novelty of the family structure in Muhammad's
revolutionary social order, he had to codify in detail its regulations.
Sex is one the instincts whose satisfaction was regulated at length by
the religious law during the first years oflslam. The link in the Muslim
mind between sexuality and the Shari'a has shaped the legal and
ideological history of the Muslim family structure and consequently of
the relation between the sexes. 208

Thus, in order to complete a discussion of rape under the Islamic legal
system, it is necessary to say a few words on the issue of sexuality. It is
interesting to note that the word zina, in addition to illicit sexual
intercourse, means "displaying one attractions," 209 "a pleasant setting,
an omament." 210 Bouhdiba links sexuality in Islam with the sacred,
defining nikah, the proper institution of sexuality, as "a sacred mission
[that] brings us closer to God." 211 "Within the limits of mkah, Islam
permits, tolerates the sexual life. It integrates it into the social,
communal life of the umma while warmly recommending believers to
take their share (nasib) of the sexual pleasures, which are an essential
prefiguration of the pleasures of paradise."212 "The Islamic view of
sexuality.. .is a total one. Its aim is to integrate the sexual as everyday
experience."213
Whereas the Christian experience with sexuality has largely been
one of repression, the Islamic view can be best described as reverential.
This means that not only it is regulated and integrated into everyday
practice, but it is regarded with a measure of suspicion as the potential
207
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source of social chaos, fin ta. It is important to understand that women, as
the carriers of zina, become the embodiment of .finta. "In Islam ... the
whole system is based on the assumption that the woman is a powerful
and dangerous being. All sexual institutions (polygamy, repudiation,
sexual segregation) can be perceived as a strategy for containing her
power."214 Thus, far from being repressed, sexuality becomes implicit in
all interactions between the sexes.
In Islam, then, family honour becomes closely associated with the
sexual behaviour of its women. Abu-Odeh argues that the demands of
the honour/shame society require that the female body becomes
"inseparable from the performance of virginity" at a social level.2 15
Women are required not only to preserve actual virginity, but to produce
and perform the social affects of such virginity by conforming to the
prohibitive demands imposed by the society and the law. For abu-Odeh,
a woman's vaginal hymen metaphorically becomes a social one as well,
so that even after she marries, she must still
virginity and her
failure to do so is a social, rather than a private issue. Thus, it can be said
that a woman's body becomes conflated with the body ofislam- and as
such must be protected from possible contamination. Women's sexual
practices are regulated and constantly monitored because they become a
potential source of pollution for the collective umma. 216
Memissi argues that female subordination in Islam is about the
protection of the umma, rather than about women themselves. She
states:
women's disobedience is so feared in Islam because its implications
are enormous. They refer to the most dreaded danger to Islam as a
group psychology: individualism. I want to suggest here that Muslim
societies resist women's claims to changing status, that they repress
feminist trends which are actually evident all over the Muslim world,
and they condemn them as Western imports, not simply because these
societies fear women, but because they fear individualism.
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... the woman, identified in the Muslim order as the embodiment of
uncontrolled desires and undisciplined passions, is precisely the
symbol of heavily suppressed individualistic trends, I believe that if
the issues of the veil are so central to Muslim fundamentalist
movements today, it is because these movements can be interpreted as
strong visceral reactions against individualism. 217

An independent woman is considered dangerous in Islam because a
"women who rebels against her husband, for instance, is also rebelling
against the umma, against reason order, and indeed, God. The rebellion
of a woman is linked to individualism, not community (zmzma); passion,
not reason; disorder, not order; lawlessness (finta) not law."218 Thus,
when the umma is threatened, the response has traditionally been to
reinforce women's traditional roles. Bodman observes that "European
occupation and colonization of Muslim societies tended to magnify the
practice of women's seclusion; guarding them from foreign eyes
became a touchstone of the male concept of honour." 219 This reaction
was repeated during the independence movements in the middle part the
century:
A key element of the nationalist agenda was the defense of Islamic
culture. In the early stages of many nationalisms in Muslim societies,
the social status of women, as more rigidly interpreted over the
centuries, formed an integral part. The ideology demanded that
women's bodies symbolize the rejection of an alien culture by
maintaining traditional customs, such as veiling, deprecating female
opinion, and subordinating them all to male members of the family. 220

It should be noted that, in general, women accept their roles as

'guardians of the culture.' Weiss in describing the institution ofpurdah,
which "involves the physical and practical separation of the activities of
men and women," remarks that "[a]lthough not all women observe the
restrictions the purdah imposes, most do embrace the inherent values,
such as that a woman preserves her family's honour by not mixing with
unrelated men and by not wearing revealing clothing." 221
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Understanding the symbolic and psychological landscape of the
honour/shame society is important to understanding rape law in
Pakistan. Shahla states:
Pakistani women have for centuries buried in their hearts the rage and
anguish of rape. In the interests of family honour and for fear of
ostracism, they were (and still are) forced to keep quiet or face further
humiliation and abandonment by their families. Pakistani families
customarily hide the 'shame' of their women whose honour, izzat, has
been 'looted'. The society has actively discouraged public disclosures
of rape, and until very recently it preferred not to know. 222

In Pakistan, the question of rape is both a political and social issue.
Siddiqi, for instance, describes how the female body became the
metaphoric battleground where national identity was fought during the
Bangali-Pakistani war. In the theatre of the collective psyche, women's
bodies were encoded as the symbolic stage upon which the conflict was
ultimately acted out:
In popular plays on the theme of independence ... , the violation of
individual woman is often portrayed as sacrifice, for family as well as
for nation. A standard plot revolves around the woman whose husband
has been incarcerated by the military, who surrenders her body to the
degradations of army personnel in order to secure her husband's
freedom. Yet the sacrifice of her body can only be redeemed by her
exist from the plot, for her act signifies betrayal and shame as well as
sacrifice. The choice of rejoining the family is rarely exercized;
ideally, she encounters death through suicide or accident. 223

Likewise, Shahla describes the emerging phenomenon of "political
rape" in Pakistan. She argues that such rape is the modem equivalent to,
and draws its symbolism from, feudal "honour rape" where the "target
of humiliation and shame is not a particular women, but a political rival
or an old enemy on whom revenge is to be taken." 224 Shahla states:
the act of rape is more than a show of dominance through brute force
to keep women in their place. It is also more than an instrument of
Haeri Shahla, "The Politics of Dishonour: Rape and Power in Pakistan" in Mahnaz
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oppression to restrict women's movement and control their bodies.
Nor is it merely to make public examples of raped women in order to
strike in the hearts of other women, thus forcing them to obey the rules
of male power structure, and to remain within certain culturally and
religiously specified boundaries. While sharing aspects of these
elements, the specificity of the cases of these three women involves an
act of revenge aimed at dishonouring a powerful and potentially
threatening rival... When female members of her party are raped, not
only are individual women dishonoured, but symbolically Benazir
Bhutto herself, the leader of the opposition and the model of
womanhood, is 'raped' by association. How could a nation, any
nation, choose to have a raped leader? Conversely, how could a leader
who is unable to protect herself or her followers protect her country
from being invaded by its 'enemies', real or imagined? 225

It is interesting to note that, according to Shahla, "political rape" has the

tacit acceptance of the Pakistani government.

5. Islamization of Pakistan and the Crime of Rape
In the years following partition, Islamic principles have
increasingly been incorporated in the state's legal apparatus, but it was
not until the Zia government came into power in February 1979, that the
systematic process of Islamization, which involved "bringing all laws
into confonnity with Islamic tenets and values" and to "mandate the
kind of political and social institutions that had been established and
encouraged by the Prophet Mohammed," began. 226 Several authors have
theorized that tensions resulting from processes of modernization have
led to the current strategies of Islamization. Mernissa argues, for
instance, that
the primary issue being debated in the Muslim world today is
democracy-the individual right to choose society's rulers. The right
of each citizen to choose those who rule, through clear voting
procedures, is a total reversal of the idea of personhood in Islam. It is
the world upside-down. 227

In Pakistan these tensions are complicated by the context in which the
Pakistani state emerged - Pakistan was created by the Islamic minority
in India who demanded a separate state in which their community
225
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"could practice their religion as they pleased-not only in private and
family life, but also, perhaps, in the very organization of society and its
institutions." 228 Thus, Islamization has been characterized as the raison
d'etre of the Pakistani state. 229 Recently, Islamization is, in large part, a
reaction to the processes of Western modernization. For those who insist
that Pakistan be transformed into an Islamic state in the traditional sense
of the word, it is because they see it as an alternative to the modern,
capitalist state in which "men and women are virtually encouraged... to
indulge in dishonesty or illicit sex. " 230
In February 1979, the Zia government took the first concrete step
towards Islamization in Pakistan with the introduction of the Hudood
Ordinance 1979 Under this Ordinance, the sharia offences of theft,
drunkenness, zina (illicit sexual intercourse), and the bearing of false
witness have become offences against the state, and, where the
necessary burdens of proof have been met, subject to hadd Adultery,
fornication and rape are all captured under the Zzi1a Ordinance and the
evidentiary burden requires the testimony of four tazikyah-a!shuhoocf"1 who have witnessed actual penetration. Alternatively, ztna
can be established by confession. When the requirements of haddhave
not been met, the offence attracts the lessor ta 'zir punishment.
According to the legal definition, zina occurs when an adult woman
and an adult man willfully commit sexual intercourse without being
validly maITied to each other. Distinctions between fornication and
adultery are relevant only in the context of sentencing, whereby the
penalty for muhsan is death by stoning and for non-muhsan 100 lashes.
Rape, zina-bi!-jabr occurs when a person has sexual intercourse with a
man or women, to whom he or she is not malTied in any of the following
circumstances: a) against the will of the victim; b) without the consent of
the victim; c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been
obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or, d) where the
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consent is given because the victim believes that the offender is another
person to whom the victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly
married.
Not surprisingly, the evidentiary burden required to attract the
hadd punishment has proved, difficult to meet. In order to be found
the act would have to be done
guilty under hadd of zina or
in public in the presence of four upstanding members of the community.
Typically, then, zina is prosecuted as ta 'zir, and punishment is at the
a
discretion of the comt. It should be emphasized that under ta
variety of types of evidence can be admitted, including the testimony of
women. 232 Judicial discretion, however, has proven potentially perilous
for women who are unable to substantiate their claims. In the wellknown Safia Bibi case, for example, a young, blind women who was
working as a domestic servant became pregnant after being raped by her
employer and his son. The men were not punished - the first was not
charged for lack of evidence and the second was acquitted on the benefit
of doubt. Bibi, however, was found guilty of zina-bif..:Jabr on the
evidence of illegitimate pregnancy or "self-confession", and was
sentenced to 15 lashes. The Federal Shariat Court eventually reversed
the ruling, distinguishing between rape and adultery, and dismissed
Safia Bibi's sentence. 233 Since medical evidence is often not available to
substantiate claims of rape, offenders are generally released for lack of
evidence. The victims of rape, on the other hand, are often subject to
prosecution because either their allegations of rape or subsequent
pregnancy is treated as a confession of zina. Thus, the Zina Ordinance
has increasingly been used as a mechanism of social control. The
Human Rights Global Watch Report on Womens Human Rights, for
instance, states:
the vast majority of Huc!ooc!cases (most of which are registered by the
woman's husband or father) are not supp01ied by the evidence and
should not have been prosecuted. In many cases, women are
wrongfully prosecuted for Huc!ooc! offences because they refuse to
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marry men chosen by their families, decide to leave home or marry
men against their parents' will, or seek to separate from or divorce
abusive husbands. 234

It has been estimated that two thousand women are sitting in prison on
false rape charges. 235 The problem, of course, has to do with the
conflation of rape and adultery in the submission in evidence and the use
of the victim's testimony of rape as evidence of a 'confession.'

6. Feminist Strategies respecting the Pakistani Rape Law
Deciding on appropriate strategies for law reform in Pakistan
always involves an implicit debate as to whether the criminal law should
be secularized and religion made a 'private affair.' For the most part,
however, the political climate will not allow such a reconceptualization.
Currently, the trend in Pakistan is towards greater Islamization, rather
than less, where an accepted political strategy is to say one is more
Muslim then his opponent. 236 As one feminist argues, in a country where
the Muslim majority represents over ninety percent of the population,
Islam is a source of unity, "something upon which we can all agree." 237
Human rights discourses, on the other hand, are seen as Western and
antithetical to Islamic Pakistan. Thus the most effective strategies for
improving women's positions in Pakistan inevitably involve working
within Islam itself.
The basic strategy for Muslim feminist is reinterpretation of Islam
law at both a macro and a micro level. At a macro level, this means that
women are beginning to emphasize the spirit of Islam, and the position
given to them in the collective umma. It means going back to the primary
sources and reinterpreting, retranslating Islamic verses. More
importantly, however, it also means revealing the ways in which current
social practices contradict what has been 'revealed' by the []ur an and
the Prophet Muhammad. In the context of Pakistani rape laws, the
emphasis is on the appropriation and misapplication of Islamic law in
ways that are meant to subordinate women, rather than to obey Allah s
divine command. At a micro level, women are returning to the particular
234
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Islamic prescriptions and seeking reinterpretation. The difficulty, in the
context of the hadd offences, and in particular in the case of zina, is the
symbolic significance that these laws have in the construction of the
Islamic identity. There is also the issue of the apparent "explicitness" of
the language of the texts and the general consensus reached on these
provisions by the early jurists infiqh. To what extent are the doors of
fjtihad still open?
Legal reform obviously requires a restructuring of the Zina
Ordinance. Thus, Quaishi 238 maintains that rape should not be
subsumed under zina at all. She argues that rape is more analogous to the
hadd offence of hiraba or "violent undertaking" than to zina.
Traditionally, hiraba has been translated as "forcible taking", "highway
robbery", "terrorism'', or "waging war against the state" and has
generally been interpreted by the scholars to include "any type of
forcible assault upon people involving some sort of taking of property. It
differs from theft in that the Qur 'anic crime of theft (sariqa) is taking by
stealth whereas hiraba is taking by force." Alternatively, she argues that
there is textual support for treating rape as subject to civil liability
(quisas), for "wounds" or "hann to sexual organs" (/kah). Interestingly,
there seems to be some support for this approach under Iranian law. 239
Quraishi, however, although grounding her arguments in the
primary texts, implicitly uses the language of secular human rights in
her arguments. She states, for instance, that "[i]n the face of any hint of
a woman's sexual impropriety, the Qur'anic response is: walk away.
Leave her alone. Leave her dignity in tact. The honour of a women is not
a tool, it is herfimdamenta! right,, [emphasis added]. Moreover, her
criticisms of the placement of rape within the Zina Ordinance are
conceptually based on the idea that, because the {]ztr 'an requires four
witnesses to the act and defamation is punishable by hadd, the crime of
zina is really a crime of "public indecency." Although this is true in a
practical sense, and she is right to criticize the way shari 'a evidence
requirements are being used by men as instruments to terrorize and
238
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oppress women, her characterization of zina as a simple "act of
indecency" serves to undermine her argument in Islamic Pakistan. It is a
theoretical position that cannot be justified given the symbolic
significance that hadd offences have in the creation of the collective
umma. Moreover, she underestimates the importance that women, as a
symbol of cultural purity, play in the Islamic psyche.
The proper vehicle for legal reform is till being debated in Pakistan.
The challenge of such reform is to find a way of characterizing the crime
of rape in a way that is sensitive to the fundamentalist nature of Pakistani
law and the special status given to women's sexuality within the context
of an Islamic society.

v. FINAL THOUGHTS
(Tjhere is 110 /i11al word co11cemi11g the political status ()f sexual
struggles... Neither wholly a source of dom1i1atio11 11or of resistance,
sexuality is 11either outside power nor wholly c1i-cz1mscribed by it.
Instead, ti is ilse(f an arena of struggle. There are 110 inherently
liberat01y or repressive sexual practices, for any practice is cooptable and a11y is capable ofbecoming a source ()fresista11ce. No

In all three countries - Finland, Canada, and Pakistan - rape law
has emerged as a site of gender conflict and negotiation. But in each
case, the way in which the battle is articulated, as well as the terms of its
engagement, is culturally specific. The way in which rape is culturally
understood and personally experienced is, of course, a product of the
sexual culture in which the act occurs. But sexual assault laws because
of the inherent gendered nature of these offenses necessarily impact
sexual culture. Law is always culturally symbolic. This is why feminists
must inevitably embark on a dialogue with the law. In this dialogue, law
becomes a site of gender renegotiation with its te1ms defined by the legal
culture in which it takes place. In all three countries examined both the
definition of the legal problem of rape and feminist strategies for refonn
have been and continue to be shaped by the criminal law culture in
which they are situated.
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In Canada, feminists have explicitly engaged in and initiated legal
reform. The reform has been an evolutionary process with both
legislators and courts responding to feminist critiques as they emerge.
There have been two generations of critique since the 1970s. The
process of reform was initially spurred by feminist demands that it
should be woman's experience ofrape that forms the content of the law.
In this early period, the feminist strategy was to divorce the crime of
rape from its sexual quality. This was seen as necessary as the traditional
legal framework had privileged an inherently androcentric sexual
standpoint that disadvantaged women complainants in the comiroom.
The second generation of critique, however, would see the rape-as-sex
characterization re-emerge as a way of once again redefining the crime
of rape. Informed by the American rape debate, the distinguishing
feature of the Canadian reform process has been the emphasis on the
definition of rape. This has proved to be a divisive issue for feminists.
Liberal feminist have generally seen rape as a violent act, whereas
radical feminists see rape as somehow implicated in normal gender
relations and the prevailing norms of heterosexuality. Thinkers like
Catherine MacKinnon, for instance, have argued that male power has
been eroticized in contemporary North American society. The challenge
for legal reformers has been how to respond to these criticisms in and
through existing conceptual frameworks like legal liberalism. In other
words, how can law be used, as an "instrument of truth", to disrupt
existing social scripts? The courts have recently responded with a new
conceptual framework for understanding rape, a framework that is
implicitly infonned by the second generation of feminist critique. The
law is still evolving, however, and how this new model will impact on
existing legal principles in still unknown.
Reform in Finland has taken place within a penal philosophy that
emphasizes decriminalization and abolitionism. Within this structure,
the rape reforms are anomalous to the larger penal reform movement in
that they actually increased the scope of judicial jurisdiction. Like in
Canada, the changes to the law are too recent for one to know for certain
what their practical effects will be. What is interesting about the Finnish
reforms is the way in which they have been, in large part, a response to
the emerging feminist discourse of 'woman's law.' The challenge for
Finnish feminists has been to find a way of articulating the crime of rape
so as not to disrupt a culture of gender harmony. 'Woman's law' has
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provided feminists with the discursive space to address issues, such as
violence against women, that have traditionally been taboo within the
conceptual framework of 'equality between the sexes'. It is important to
note that the central issue for legal reformers in Finland has been
somewhat different than it has been for reformers in Canada. In Finland,
the focus has been on problems of evidence and issues oflegal definition
which arise within the context of solving these evidentiary problems.
Within the discourse of 'woman's law', however, new issues may
emerge, such as 'what is the appropriate level of fault required for
conviction?' The question becomes, 'whose understanding of events
should be emphasized?'
In order to understand the rape laws in Pakistan one must have an
understanding of the nature and scope oflslam and the special status that
women's sexuality occupies within fundamentalist Pakistan. Human
rights activists have continually demanded a repeal of the Zina
Ordinance on the basis that it is discriminatory to women and an affront
to basic human rights. However, the language of human rights, with its
emphasis on individualism, is problematic in the context of the
increasing Islamization of the Pakistani state. The better approach,
rather than to apply the human rights conceptual model, would be to
search for strategies of change within the body of Islam itself. This
approach may involve a juristic re-characterization of the crime of rape.
The gender struggle in Pakistan is particularly salient, because it
involves, at its most basic level, issues of collective identity. Therefore,
strategies of change, if they are to be successful, must involve not only
reinterpretation of the primary sources of law, but must take account of
the symbolic significance of the existing legal regime. The proper
characterization of rape must be found within this framework.
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a cross-cultural
examination of the law of rape in order to come to some understanding
of the way in which rape is both a social and a legal discourse. Engaging
in such comparative analysis can bring greater understanding of one's
own cultural and legal paradigms. This work has illustrated, for
instance, that the philosophical inquiry surrounding the definition of
rape as it has emerged within Canada and the United States is unique to
the North American cultural context where liberal legalism with its
emphasis on individualism and abstract autonomy prevails. In Finland
and Pakistan, more communitarian legal visions produce sexual assault
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laws and processes of legal reform very different than those seen in
Canada. In all three countries examined, the way in which rape is legally
defined is significant for the way gender relations are constructed. In
each case the definition of rape is the result of a synergistic exchange
between culture and law. Understanding this synergy is important in the
development of effective strategies of resistance both within and outside
of law. In this paper, for instance, making visible liberalism as the
dominant legal form in Canada highlights alternative legal visions such
as communitarianism. It can be argued that incorporating such
communitarian values into Canadian Constitutional principles such as
'fair trial', 'fundamental justice' and 'full answer and defense' would be
a significant progressive step to legal reform in Canada. Engaging in
comparative analyses is thus an important area of inquiry for feminist
researchers. The last word goes to Jennifer Nedelsky who states:
Feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape our
own lives, to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the
definition given to us by others (men and male dominated society, in
particular). Feminists therefore need a language of freedom with
which to express the value underlying this concern. But that language
must also be true to the equally important feminist precept that any
good theorizing will start with people in their social contexts. 241
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Supra note 40.

